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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Corporate Governance Policies of Institutional Investors and its Application 
in Korean firms 
 
 
By Tong-Wook Shim 
 
 
Since the Financial Crisis in Korea there have been numerous changes in corporate 
governance in both the private and public sectors. The increasing involvement of 
foreign investors in the restructuring process challenged Korean companies to further 
evolve their corporate governance systems. Corporate governance seeks to define the 
structural relationship among shareowners, the board and management. Ultimately 
corporate governance aims to raise transparency as well as the accountability of 
management to shareowners, while avoiding agency costs. Many studies have found a 
strong positive correlation between good corporate governance and companies’ 
performance; good corporate governance, it is widely believed, lowers the cost of 
capital in the long run. Effective corporate governance implies several virtues including 
the maximization of profits (and reduction of corruption) that are seen as necessary 
elements of a healthy market. Many worldwide institutions, including the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), feel the need to outline 
principles of corporate governance.  
Another recent social phenomenon is the institutionalization in the stock market. 
Institutional investors now hold between 50 to 60% of all shares; this rate is increasing 
as is the rate of international diversification. The California Public Employee’s 
 4 
Retirement System (CalPERS), a public fund, and the Teachers Insurance and Annuity 
Association –College Retirement Equity Fund TIAA-CREF, a private pension fund, 
manage over 400 billion dollars together in the US alone. 1  Korean firms and 
institutional investors have been increasingly pressured to reinforce and activate 
stronger corporate governance measures, given that foreign investors’ share in the 
Korean stock market represents 36% of market value, as of February 2002. According 
to both the 1999 Korn/Ferry survey and a KSE survey, Korean corporate governance 
still lagged far behind international standards. Problems that were particularly acute 
included: the (lack of) independence of directors, the disparity between controlling 
rights’ and ownership rights’, and the negligence of institutional investors to take a 
more active role in protecting depositors rights. Such serious problems still persist, 
despite the financial crisis. Two recent surveys -- one from Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 
and the other from Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) -- further confirm the lower 
degree of corporate governance in Korea, while pointing out the positive relation 
between corporate governance and ROE.  
     The paper suggests that the sustainable growth of the Korean stock market 
requires that 1) the government deregulate restrictions on pension funds stock 
investments and 2) institutional investors be required to prepare their own corporate 
governance guidelines and disclose them to the public. Ideally, individual investors 
should be able to entrust their money with institutional investors, while companies need 
to encourage stable patterns in equities sales by meeting the expectations of institutional 
investors. Such an improvement is not just a single act but rather requires systematic 
change. 
 
 
                                            
1 CalPERS, the largest U.S. public pension fund, manages over $160 billion USD in assets; TIAA-CREF, the largest 
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Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION 
 
On Friday April 26 the Korean stock market (KOSPI) plunged under 900, 
recording a 43-point (4.7%) drop, the largest fall since the 911 accident. One reason for 
the fall was the decline of the U.S. market the previous day, but an even worse impact 
came from a murky stock transaction between the controlling shareholders and 
subsidiary of LG Chemicals. This transaction cooled down KOSPI, as rumors 
concerning a lack of transparency once again abounded. Investors responded to the 
shady deal with a ‘walk on wall street’ – the stock price of LG’s major companies 
crashed by almost 20%; within a few short hours, 1.9 trillion KRW in market value 
evaporated due to poor corporate governance practices.  
There has been extensive discussions on corporate governance in academic 
research and business areas since the 1980’s, and it has taken over a century develop 
theories related to effective capital allocation. The recent bankruptcy of Enron has 
forced U.S. regulators, politicians, accountants, and the business community to 
reconsider the proper role of corporate governance. 
It is widely agreed that corporations provide the best structure to create wealth for 
a majority of people. By splitting shares from major ownership to disperse risk, and 
separating ownership and management to increase efficiency, corporations have grown 
in both their size and effectiveness.2 
But concentrating economic power in the hands of management caused various 
                                            
2 According to Dean Robert Clark of Harvard Law School, the four characteristics essential to the vitality and appeal 
of the corporate form are: a. limited liability for investors, b. free transferability of investors interests, c. legal 
personality (entity-attributable powers, life span, and purpose), d. centralized management (Corporate Governance 
2nd,2001.Robert A. G. Monks  Nell Minow) 
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problems, including agency problems, moral hazards, conflicts of interest and social 
responsibilities. It was due to such reasons that the board system arose, aiming to   
control (or at least reduce) the problems associated with management ‘abuses’. In recent 
years, solid corporate governance has been defined as the sharing of power of three 
main pillars -- shareowners, directors, and management. 3  Corporate governance, 
therefore, seeks to define a balanced relationship among these three participants, in the 
hopes of advancing the profitability and long-term survival of corporations. It is 
noteworthy that the ultimate purpose of corporate governance is the ‘transparency’ of 
management, coupled with ‘accountability’ to directors and shareholders. Even though 
these two important factors do not guarantee that a company will perform well, they at 
least indicate the direction that most companies seek to pursue in the future. We may 
also note that good corporate governance is enhanced both through the enhanced the 
transparency of management and the accountability of directors.  
As Alan Greenspan commented at the Stern School of Business, any legislative 
and regulatory initiatives to strengthen the duties of CEO with respect to accounting and 
disclosure and to force selection of slates of directors who are patently independent of 
CEO influence and thereby significantly diminish the role of CEO could not be the 
overall solution. Because potentially this creates competing power centers within a 
corporation and thus dilute coherent control, in turn impairing effective governance.4 
                                            
3 Berle & Means model was challenged by LLS&V research. Contrary to the model LLS&V found that only 1/3 of 
worldwide companies does fit to the separation ownership and management model. They argued the more important 
thing is the how to control the controlling shareholders who manage the company directly and how to protect minor 
shareholders. 
4 At his remarks on corporate governance on March 26,2002, even he expected legislative and regulatory move 
following the bankruptcy of Enron, he was certain that institutional investors’ exertion far more control over 
corporation affairs than they appear to be willing to exercise would be better way under current CEO-dominant 
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Therefore what is needed is some structural balance between effective management and 
transparency of management; if such balance does not natural exist, intermediate 
adjustors are needed. Greenspan further asserted that institutional investors make a 
credible alternative to the concentration of power that many American CEOs possess. 
Of course, even the definition of institutional investor varies from country to 
country, according to their various legal and financial regimes. Some define institutional 
investors as specialized financial institutions that manage savings collectively on behalf 
of small investors toward a specific objective in terms of acceptable risk, return 
maximization, and maturity of claims. One of the most important developments in 
financial markets in recent years has undoubtedly been the institutionalization of 
savings fueled through the growth of pension funds, life insurance companies, and 
mutual funds.5 The volume of such investment instruments has dramatically risen in 
recent decades due to several factors, including: demographic influences (a larger base 
of aging people), greater wealth accumulation, as well as the development of more 
specialized and sophisticated financial instruments, as in derivatives.6 Each type of 
institutional investor takes a different investment approach in terms of their portfolio, 
                                                                                                                               
paradigm. (http://www.federalreserve.gov) 
5 Institutional Investors (Davis & Steil, 2001) 
6 Their claims valued at 100% of G-7 GDP and also account 30% of financial intermediation and 30% of household 
sector assets. These figure are much higher in countries such as the United States and United Kingdom, where 
institutional assets are almost twice GDP. Convergence of the rest of the G-7 on these levels would accordingly entail 
massive further expansion of institutional investment.( see Institutional Investors-Davis & Steil) 
Twenty-five wonderful trends of the twentieth century (The greatest century that ever was: 25 Miraculous Trends of 
the Past 100 years, Stephen Moore and  Julian L Simson) 
Trends     Life expectancy    Per Capita GDP      Household asset       Poverty rate            
1900-1920     47 yrs       $4,800 (‘98dollars)      $ 6 trill (1945)       40% of US household 
1995-1998     77 yrs       $31,500  (“)           $ 41 trill            13% of US household 
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length of investment period; such decisions, of course, are mainly dependent on the 
characteristics of the clients they represent. But generally, with the exception of mostly 
mutual funds, they hold their assets long periods of time. It is for this precise reason we 
ought to be concerned with institutional investors – for they are quickly becoming the 
major shareholder in numerous corporations, and in turn hold the keys to maintain 
sustainable growth. Naturally, they have learned to expand their investment abroad as 
well, to lessen systematic market risks that cannot be avoided within any domestic 
market. 
Although to date there seems to be no clear evidence to support the claim that 
institutional investors’ activism increases the performance of corporations, their 
prominent market share and purpose of their activism deserves attention; it is therefore 
worthwhile to review their policies and principles regarding corporate governance, and 
to duly heed their views, when deemed necessary.7 The financial crisis of 1997 resulted 
in a near total loss of confidence of both domestic and foreign investors in Korean 
financial markets. The government managed to successfully restore credibility through 
deregulation; foreign investment in the Korean stock market became quickly 
liberalized.8 
                                            
7 While Nesbitt(1994)finds that companies targeted for monitoring by CalPERS outperform S&P index by 41% over 
subsequent five year period, Smith(1996) and Wahal (1996) finds successful market reaction on shareholder proposal 
but fails to to notice any improvement in firm’s operating performance 
8 Starting in 1992,Korean government completely removed limits on foreign investors in Korean stock market in 
May 1998 ,except specific public companies, which still limited 40%  
Market open schedule    (unit:%) 
Date 92.1.3 94.12.1 95.7.1 96.4.1 96.10.1 97.5.2 97.11.3 97.12.11 97.12.30 98.5.2 
Total 10.00 12.00 15.00 18.00 20.00 23.00 26.00 50.00 55.00 100.00 
Person 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 50.00 50.00 100.00 
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The goal of this thesis is to discuss the institutionalization of the Korean stock 
market, and to provide some ideas for better corporate governance to institutional 
investors and publicly traded companies. Part Ⅱ, THE GROWING POWER OF 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, describes the 
concept of corporate governance, the scope of institutional investors and the role they 
play, as well as their activism. In Part Ⅲ, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES 
OF  INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, the principles or policies of various institutional 
investors are reviewed, by comparing the various Korean institutional investors that 
exist. Part III also includes international perspectives concerning organizational 
principles and governmental legislations. Part Ⅳ, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND PERFORMANCE IN KOREAN COMPANIES, empirical tests are applied to 
help explain the relation between corporate governance and performance in the market 
or in the area of accounting. Unfortunately, a regression model could not be utilized in 
this research due to the lack of data available in the Korean market. But with valuable 
data from S & P and CLSA, we can garner some key ideas. Part Ⅴconcludes with 
improvement recommendations for Korean institutional investors and public companies.  
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Ⅱ.  THE GROWING POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
2-1 Corporate Governance  
 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance state that corporate governance 
includes a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. OECD principles also provide the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance. CalPERS quotes the definition of corporate 
governance from Robert A.G Monks and Nell Minow, feeling that it represents the 
relationship among various participants in determining the direction and performance of 
corporations. The SCGOP(“The Foundation for Corporate Governance Research for 
Pension Funds”) Handbook states that corporate governance is concerned with the way 
companies are managed and managements are supervised. The SCGOP Handbook goes 
on to state that various parties in companies play their own specific roles; management 
and executive boards are responsible for managing the company; supervisors and non-
executive boards regulate management boards; work councils can advise managements; 
while shareholders are responsible for appointing members of the supervisory and 
management boards, as well as auditors.9 
There are differences of opinion as to what form of corporate governance is best 
                                            
9 see preamble of OECD Principles of Corporate Governance : SG/CG(99)5 
Also: see Corporate Governance Core Principles & Guideline (Apr.13,1998) of California Public Employee’s 
Retirement System. And: the SCGOP Corporate Governance Handbook 
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for a company. The way in which publicly listed companies are managed varies from 
country to country because of differences in history and culture, in laws and regulation, 
in the pattern of ownership, and in the structure of capital markets. Much literature 
makes a distinction between Anglo-Saxon, German and Japanese models of corporate 
governance. The U.K. and U.S. that focus on shareholders’ interests typify the Anglo-
Saxon model. German and Japanese models, in contrast, focus on stakeholders’ interests. 
Otherwise we differentiate such models as market-oriented or control-oriented. Europe 
usually applies a ‘two-tier’ board system that has a supervisory board and executive 
board, contrary to the one-tier board system used in Anglo-Saxon systems. Regardless 
of these differences, core principles on corporate governance nevertheless remain, as 
stipulated in OECD principles, The International Corporate Governance 
Network(ICGN) statements, and others.  
The first basic principle is regarding shareholder rights, and their timely access to 
financial information, voting rights, and their involvement in the process and approval 
of important matters. The second basic principle concerns takeover defenses to 
guarantee the continuity of a company (in exceptional situations) but not the continuity 
of management against shareholders’ interests. A third core principle concerns 
management structure; independence of directors should be secured and conflicts of 
interest should be avoided. Last, transparency is widely seen as a vital principle of 
corporate governance. Transparency includes the disclosure of strategy, the 
rationalization of the decision making process within a company, as well as the 
remuneration of executives and non-executive directors. Shareholder rights, takeover 
defenses, management structure and transparency are basic principles, rather than a   
system onto themselves. Corporate governance seeks to heighten accountability to those 
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bearing the brunt of risk–bearing capital: shareholders. 
 
2-2 The Scope of Institutional Investors and Investment Patterns 
 
As mentioned before, the definition of institutional investors varies from country to 
country according to their specific market system, but mostly includes pension funds, 
insurance companies, mutual funds, banks, and trust companies. Each of these 
institutional investors has an investment pattern characterized by the needs of their 
customers.  
Brancato suggested a spectrum by differentiating investors from traders, with 
investors at one end of the spectrum, and traders at the other.10 Investors are those 
whose interest are more fully aligned with the success of the corporation, and traders are 
those whose interests are more narrowly focused on achieving rates of return over a 
more limited duration, regardless of the ultimate effect on the corporation. 
 Figure 2-1 : Level of Shareholder Participation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             
                                            
10 Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance-Best practices for Increasing Corporate Value (Carolyn Kay 
Brancato,1997 The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc) 
 
Table 2-1 Level of Shareholder Participation 
 
Level2 Shareholder
Passive investor i
financial but Active
in voting. 
Ex) CalPERS 
NYSCRF, Index
Level1 Sharehold r
Active investor in
financial and voting
terms 
Ex) Warren Buffett 
LENS,Inc 
Lev l3 Shareholder
Active investor in
financial term but
passive in voting 
Ex)trustee account
at Banks, corporate
Lev l4 Shareholder
Trader in financial
term and passive in
voting 
Ex) money
man g r, raiders,
Investors Traders 
Source : Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance (Carolyn Kay Brancato,1997) 
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It is very important for corporate executives to understand investment 
characteristics, and the behavior of various shareholders along a spectrum when they 
make business decisions that effect shareholders. Such an understanding is the basis to 
build a mutually acceptable framework of reference regarding investment strategies and 
corporate governance. Both investors and traders play vital roles in markets; investors’ 
interests are more aligned with the long-term intrinsic value of the firm, while traders 
occupy a critical place in the securities market by supplying liquidity to support 
sustained investment. Warren Buffett (and LENS Inc.) represents another type of 
investor called relationship investors; they are typically active investors, interested in 
strategic investments that gain them voting rights. 11  To these ends, relationship 
investors invest in only a small number of companies and become more involved 
developing in-depth relationships with their portfolio companies. Robert A.G. Monks 
and Nell Minow classify this as value investing. In a recent article, Monks suggests that  
‘global investors’ offer a solution to the instinctive problems of most corporations; 
global investors are defined as investors that buy significant amounts of equities 
                                            
11Warren Buffett is chairperson of the board of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., and well known for making wise 
acquisitions of relatively small, well-run enterprises. A 1994 annual report of Berkshire Hathaway listed the 
company’s ownership stake in American Express (5.5%), Capital Cities/ABC,Inc (13%), Coca Cola (7.8%), Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage (6.3%), Gannett Co.,Inc (4.9%), GEICO Corp (50.2%), and the like. By year’s end (1994), the 
cost of all stocks purchased totaled $4.9 billion US, while market value reached an estimated $14 billion, for a book 
profit of $9.4 billion. Berkshire espouses that their `acquisition criteria’ is to make large purchases that can 
demonstrate consistent earning power, in businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt, 
with management in place and governing a simple business plan 
The LENS fund began in 1992 with the purpose of acting as an active money manager in what maybe regarded as the 
first ’corporate governance fund’ (Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance, Brancato) 
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worldwide, and he believes that they practice responsible ownership wherever their 
bases are.12 The focus of Monks global investors was in the arena of retirement funds 
and charitable foundations. Regardless of their investment behavior, the institutional 
investors include public pension funds, corporation pension funds, mutual funds, 
insurance companies, banks, and trusts.13 
 
2-3 The Economic Clout of Institutional Investment 
 
In recent decades, the field of institutional investment has mushroomed in global 
financial markets due to aging populations, greater wealth accumulation, and the 
sophistication of financial instruments, as previously mentioned. By mid-1995 U.S. 
institutional investors held assets worth $10.2 trillion -- nearly 22% of all U.S. financial 
assets. While their holdings in the equity markets have remained steady at 
approximately 50%, by the end of 1995, their ownership in the largest 1,000 U.S. 
corporations increased to 57.2%, up from 46.6 % in 1987.14 
Growth in institutional investment during the past 25 years has been 
                                            
12 In The Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith identified four threats borne out in the modern corporation: infinite 
lifespan, limitless size, ever growing power, unlimited license 
13 In Korea, several laws mention institutional investors, as in the Banking Acts, Securities Transactions Act, and 
Corporate Tax law. Generally they include banks, securities companies, insurance companies, non-banking financial 
intermediaries and others (see The role of Institutional Investors in the Evolution of Corporate Governance in Korea, 
Lee Jae woong, Seo-gang Univ.) 
14 Institutional Investors (Brancato,1995) pp.20 
   Institutional Ownership in the 1,000 Corporation: 1987-1995 
               ’87       ’90        ’92        ’93        ’94        ‘95 
              46.6%     49.5%     52.8%     55.8%     57.1%     57.2%  
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extraordinary. Total institutional investor assets nearly tripled in one decade, from 
$672.6 billion in 1970 to $1.9 trillion in 1980. The next decade brought more than a 
tripling of assets, to $6.3 trillion in 1990. There was an additional, staggered increase of 
more than 50% in next four years, to $9.6 trillion by the end of 1994. Then in a single 
year – during the stock market in boom of 1995 – institutional investments rose to $ 
11.2 trillion by the year’s end. The annual growth rate of institutional investors averaged 
14.9% during the first half of the 1980s and then leveled off to 10.8% during second 
half of the 1980s. Aided by the boom in the stock market, assets grew 13.3% 
between1990 to 1993, slowed to 2.1% growth in 1994, then again boomed to 16.3% in 
1995.15 Table 2-2 shows that U.S. institutional investors continue to amass unparalleled 
amounts of financial assets while achieving robust growth. Total institutional investor 
assets grew 16.7% from 1996-1997; 13.7% from 1997-1998; and 14.3% from 1998 to 
the end of 1999. In 2000, the institutional investments rose marginally to $19.5 trillion 
from $19.3 trillion at the end of 1999. U.S. institutions continue to control nearly half of 
the U.S. equity market, although this amount has leveled off in recent years due to 
increased individual investing 16 . In Korea as well, total amount of institutional 
investors’ assets has grown explosively, at an average of 33% per annum from 1992 to 
1999 (except 1997, the year of the financial crisis). In 2000, Korean institutional 
investors total assets fell to $ 296.5 billion US, due to the slowing stock market. Table 
2-1 compares the size of Korean institutional investor assets with three other prominent 
OECD countries. 
                                            
15 Institutional Investors (Brancato,1995) pp.20 
   Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook, OECD  (2001 edition) 
16 The Conference Board (www.conference-boad/org) and OECD Statistical Yearbook 2001 edition 
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Table 2-1 
Financial Assets of Institutional Investors Unit: US$ billion 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Korea 161.4 189.4 220.2 266.4 284 169.2 326.4 375.9 296.5 
Japan 3012.6 3628.5 4024.8 4322.7 3931 3517.7 4075.7 5039.8 na 
UK 1207.2 1543.6 1522.1 1814.9 2225.5 2624.4 2889.9 3264.8   
US 8035.3 9051.7 9584.9 11239.5 12729.4 14842.2 16873.2 19279 19450.9 
 Source: Institutional Investors statistical yearbook, OECD 2001 
 Pension funds are the single largest category among institutional investors. 
Their growth was attributed to U.S. regulatory policy; corporate pension funds began 
under federal regulations established by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) of 1974.17 By the first half of 1995, pension funds accounted for 48.1% of 
total institutional investor assets. Pension funds also registered the largest increases in 
size, from $860 billion in 1980 to $4.9 trillion by mid 1995.18  
Pension funds still control the largest block of U.S. institutional assets; in 1999, 
they constituted 47.5% of all institutional investor assets. Within the pension fund 
category, state and local funds have grown most rapidly from $0.8 trillion in 1990 to 
$2.7 trillion in 1999 and they now account for 14.5% of total institutional investor 
assets - up from 13.0% in 1990. Meanwhile, open ended mutual funds have enjoyed 
staggering growth from $0.9 trillion in 1990 to $4.1 trillion in 1999 and they now 
account for 21.9% of all institutional investor assets - up from 14.5% in 199019.  
State and local pension funds now devote 69.3% of their total assets to equities, 
up from 36.1% in 1990. This increase reflects a pervasive movement on the part of 
                                            
17 ERISA pension funds are modeled on trust law, whereby a fiduciary must act for the exclusive benefit of pension 
plan participants and beneficiaries. By providing this framework for confidence, ERISA inspired the investment of 
vast sums in US corporate pension plans.(Institutional Investors 1997 Brancato) 
18 Institutional Investors (Brancato,1997) 
19 The Conference Board (www.conference-boad/org) 
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these public pension funds to diversify their portfolios into equities from their 
historically more conservative investments in the bond markets. In 1990, these public 
pension funds accounted for only 8.4% of the total equity market. But by the end of 
1999, they accounted for 9.9% of total equities. By comparison, corporate pension 
funds actually lost ground as a percentage of total equity ownership: in 1990 they held 
16.8% of total equities, which had declined to 13.2% by 1999. So pension fund 
occupied 23.1% of total equities. Even total public fund in Korea reached 571.7 trillion 
KRW basically the law prohibited the fund from investing in the stock without fitness to 
their purpose of establishment and public interests20. 
Of late, mutual funds have become more relevant in corporate governance 
matters, since they are amassing considerable amounts of equities by devoting a larger 
proportion of their assets to equities and enjoying considerable growth at the same time 
so that they command a larger proportion of the equity market. In 1990 they devoted 
23% of their total assets to equities, representing only 6% of the total equity market, but 
by year-end 1999 they devoted 58.8% of their total assets to equities, representing 
12.7% of the total equity market21. 
Institutional investors controlled 49.6% of the 1999 equity market, down slightly 
from 50.1% in 1998. Historically, institutional investors have accounted for greater and 
greater percentages of the equity market; for example in 1980 they accounted for only 
33.9% of total equities, but by 1995 they accounted for 46.6% of total equities. Since 
then, institutional control of the equity market has been in the 48-50% range and 
                                            
20 Summary of status of Funds (Public Funds) from Ministry of Planning and Budgeting of Korea,2002 
   The law for the management of Funds (Article 3-3) 
21 The Conference Board (www.conference-boad/org) 
 14 
declined to 49.6% during 199922 . The fact that individuals have come into the 
marketplace at a more rapid pace during the past few years, and are less likely to vote 
their proxies on governance issues, actually reinforces the governance clout of the more 
organized and activist institutions. These pension fund institutions are under a fiduciary 
obligation to vote their proxies and therefore tend to exercise their governance oversight 
in their portfolio companies more extensively.  
What need to be considered are not only the amount of holding but also the 
amount of management, since many institutions allocate a large portion of their assets to 
other institutions to manage on their behalf. As table 2-2 shows, pension funds manage 
less than 50% of the assets they hold (20.2%); further, it may be noted, investment & 
insurance companies manage a greater proportion of total assets, 24.5% & 27.3%, 
respectively. Therefore in regards to pension funds, companies need to focus on other 
intermediaries when they plan corporate strategies to attract institutional investors. 
  Turnover rates, which affect the stability of the stock market, are another vital 
aspect of institutional investments. Table 2-3 shows the average turn over rates of 
typical institutions.  As expected, money managers recorded higher rates as compared 
with the turnover rates of public pension funds, which is the result of the higher level of 
funds they index. Managers of public pension funds trade less, since they are less 
inclined to believe that they cannot beat the market returns to cover their transactions 
costs. 
                                            
22 The Conference Board (www.conference-boad/org) Possible reasons for the slowing and now stalled trend in 
institutional holdings of the total equity market are:  The trend by institutional investors to invest in hedge funds and 
other "private market" equities; A strong increase in individual shareholdings prompted by recent bull markets and 
easier on-line stock purchasing outlets for individuals; . New initial public offerings (IPOs), which pump equities into 
the markets but are generally below minimum capitalization thresholds for institutional investors; 
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2-4 Activism of Institutional Investors 
 
During the early 1990’s, the collapse of takeover bids helped boost activism by 
TABLE 2-2: Institutional Investor Holding versus Management(1994) 
       
        Institution               Assets Held          Assets Managed 
     Pension funds                    47.4%                20.2% 
        Private trusteed                        26.3                      15.5 
          Private Insured                         8.4                       0.0 
          State & Local                         12.6                       4.7 
     External investment advisors         0.0                  8.2 
     Investment companies              18.6                 24.5 
     Insurance companies               20.0                 27.3 
     Banks                           11.9                 19.4 
     Foundations                       2.1                  0.4          
          Total                     100.0%              100.0% 
Source: The Brancato Report on Institutional Investment, 3rd ed (Jan.1996) 
TABLE 2-3: Average Turnover Rates and Equity Indexation (Sep.30, 1995) 
       
        Type                   1993         1994        1995    Indexation 
     Corporate pension funds          33.2%         19.9%      24.8%      13.2% 
     Public pension fund             13.3          20.9        20.7        66.8 
     Mutual fund managers            48.2          50.5        42.3         - 
     Money managers                56.7          55.7       59.2         1.0 
     Insurance companies             53.6           44.7       46.4         4.2 
     Banks                         24.3          29.5       25.3         32.9 
      
Weighted average for             41.5%         43.6%      42.6%      14.9% 
     All institutions 
Source: The Brancato Report on Institutional Investment,3,ed 1 (Jan.1996) 
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removing them as an alternative means of corporate control. The U.S. shareholders’ 
activist movement was further encouraged in the early 1990s by a SEC ruling that 
allowed coalition building, which enabled investors to collude more readily. Since that 
time pension funds such as CalPERS and the New York Employees Pension Fund 
(NYEPE) voted on resolutions that they may have previously ignored. Shareholder 
activists have tried to: 
 challenge excessive executive compensation and takeover protection 
 split the role of chairpersons and chief executives 
 remove under performing chief executives23 
 ensure that independent directors are elected to boards24 
 ensure that new directors be appointed by non-executives. 
 
There has been a lot of dispute on the effectiveness of active involvement of 
institutional investors with corporate management. Many wonder whether such 
involvement really improves the performance of a company in terms of market or 
accounting returns. Empirical testing has resulted in mixed results. On the positive side, 
Wahal (1996), Strickland et al (1996) found positive effects relative to gains in share 
prices. Conversely, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999), Wahal (1994), Gillan and Starks 
(1995), M.P.Smith (1996) found that no statistically significant positive returns over the 
long term. But there does seem to have been positive results in the case of CalPERS 
involvement. CalPERS targeted inferior companies, and through corporate governance 
                                            
23 in the early 1990s, such examples include: IBM, Westinghouse, Kodak, Amex, and General Motors.  
24 CalPERS agreed to support Texaco management in a takeover bid as long as they accepted independent directors. 
Pressure by CalPERS and NYEPF also forced GM to accept a resolution to make more than half their directors 
independent. (Institutional Investors; Davis and Steil 2001) 
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reforms, improved the returns of such firms. Companies that successfully employ 
investors enjoy less stock price volatility and a lower cost of capital, enabling them to 
make in-depth investments necessary to achieve sustained growth. A full alignment of 
the interest of management, boards, and investors is the key to improving sustained 
corporate performance in order to maximize profits for the benefit of corporations and 
investors alike.  
U.S. shareholder activism started in the 1930s with individual shareholder 
concern over corporate accountability. Many labor groups and shareholder groups like 
CIC, CII, ICCR, IRRC, ISS, and IRAA helped mobilize U.S institutional investors; 
such organizations allowed such investors to become more powerful, to gain more 
economic and political clout than they could otherwise achieve as a single large 
institution. 25  Brancato explains institutional investors activism as a series of 
developmental stages, as follows: ① pressing corporations to adopt shareholders 
resolution on ‘social issues’ ② opposing management when corporations institute 
certain anti takeover tactics ③ urging corporations to make structural changes in their 
boards of directors and voting procedures ④ analyzing the performance of 
corporations and their board of directors to identify under performing companies to be 
targeted for shareholder action and ⑤ turning to non financial aspects of corporate 
performance in order to understand the ability of certain operations to perform not only 
over a historic period but to generate a stream of future benefits.26 The first stage 
                                            
25 CIC: The Corporate Information Center (1969), CII: The Council of Institutional Investors (1984), ICCR: The 
Interfaith Center of Corporate Responsibility in New York, IRRC: The Investor Responsibility Research Center Inc. 
(1972), ISS: Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. IRAA: The Investors’ Rights Association of America (1994) 
 
26 Institutional Investors (pp 82) 
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(‘social issues’), she indicates, was the period from 1931 to 1970, where the movement 
initiated by Lewis Gilbert attempted to transform annual meetings from ‘perfunctory 
legal rituals to forums for discussion between management and shareholders. Later this 
‘annoying gadflies’ movement was succeeded by Saul Alinsky, who lead a group called 
FIGHT, which pressured Kodak to hire and train black people. This kind of social 
activism also surfaced during the anti-Vietnam War of the late 1960s.  Two cases 
involving Dow and GM in the 1970s typically represent this type of social activism. In 
one case involving DOW, U.S. courts overruled the SEC’s support of Dow that allowed 
management the right to engage in business decisions without the interference of 
shareholders. The court’s action launched the social investing movement by permitting 
social responsibility issues to be included among shareholder resolutions. By 
establishing the Public Policy Committee in 1970 (as proposed by four public interest 
lawyers), GM made a landmark case for the social responsibility movement.  
The modern institutional investors movement was born in the 1980s in the U.S. 
when takeover waves began as two-tiered bidding.27 While institutional investors were 
concerned that they might be in breach of their own fiduciary duties if they did not sell 
or tender their share to raiders, corporations responded to these raiders by instituting 
various anti takeover tactics, many of which protected management at the financial 
expense of shareholders, prompting institutional investors to become involved in 
corporate governance matters.28 According to one news release from the Korean Stock 
                                            
27  Raiders typically buy a block of shares making a bid for 51% of shares outstanding, at a higher price offered on 
the market; then, having gaining control, they would engage in a `mop up’ transaction for the remaining 49% of 
shares at a significantly lower ‘back end’ price. 
28 There are many takeover related provisions; anti-greenmail provisions, consider non-financial effects of mergers, 
fair price provisions, poison pills, supermajority vote to approve merger, classified board (staggering term), 
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Exchange, during the period of March 2001 to February 2002, only 80 institutional 
investors disclosed their exercising voting rights. 95% of their voting was favorable to 
any given proposal, especially if the agenda of elected board members were in 100% 
agreement. This may be the result of the relationships that exist between institutional 
investors and the businesses that they are affiliated with. Given the country’s chaebol 
structure, it is common for bank and insurance companies to take deposits from 
companies and then lend the money back to them as a regular part of their operation. 
Mutual funds are not an exception to this case, either. This type of interdependence 
hinders Korean institutional investors from exercising independent voting rights. 
                                                                                                                               
cumulative voting, confidential voting, dual class stock, Limited shareholder ability to act by written consent or to 
call a special meeting, unequal voting rights. 
* Summary of corporate Governance Provision for 1,500 Companies Tracked by IRRC (Brancato pp 106) 
              Provision                     1990           1993             1995          
   Advance notice requirement                    N/A             N/A            657 
   Anti greenmail                               84              93              90 
   Blank check preferred stock                    N/A             N/A           1,275 
   Classified board                              850             862             895 
   Confidential voting                            48              139            176 
   Consider non financial effects of mergers          96               111            108 
Cumulative voting                            263              233             216 
Dual class stock                             112              122             124 
Eliminate cumulative voting                   131              150             156 
Fair price                                  475              492            487 
Golden parachutes                           N/A              N/A           799 
Limit right to call special meeting               355              424            466 
Limit action by written consent                 352              416            467 
 Poison pill                                 759              795            799 
 Supermajority vote to approve merger           252              269            267 
  Unequal voting rights                         34               31             30    
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Pension funds, on the other hand, are legally free from these obstacles.29 
As for major institutional players in terms of shareholder activism, there is The 
Investor’s Right Association, CalPERS, TIAA-CREF, and Taft-Hartly union pension 
funds that is comprised of over 3,100 members totaling $300 billion in assets. Table 2-4 
lists major of institutional investors -- so called global investors -- in terms of their 
managed assets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U.S. institutional investors have increased their presence in foreign equity 
markets, not only in terms of their equity position, but also with regard to the level and 
intensity of their participation in international corporate governance. US pension funds 
                                            
29 Parthiban David and Kochhar addressed three barriers to effective corporate governance facing institutional 
investors: relationship oriented barriers,  barriers arising from government regulation, & information processing 
barriers (European Management Journal Vol 14 No5 pp457-466). 
Table 2-4: Global Investors Profile 
 
Rank               Fund                   Country      Assets(US$ billion) 
 1   Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP             Netherlands           159.9 
 2   California Public Employees’ Retirement       US               133.5 
 3   Assoc. of Local Public Service Personnel      Japan              101.3 
 4   New York State Common Retirement Fund      US               99.7 
 5   General Motors Investment Management Corp   US                87.0 
 6   California State Teachers’ Retirement          US                82.6 
 7   Alimanna Pensionsfonden(Board 1,2 &3)     Sweden              80.1 
 8   Florida State Board of Administration          US                77.5 
 9   Nat’l Public Service Personnel               Japan               75.6 
 10  New York State Teachers’ Retirement System    US                71.1 
 11  Texas Teachers Retirement                   US                69.5 
 12  Public School Personnel                    Japan               67.1 
 13  Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board      US               64.5 
 14  New Jersey Division of Investment             US               63.3 
 15  General Electric                            US               58.7 
 
Source : 1999 Pension & Investment/Intersec World 300 Pension Funds 
 21 
and mutual funds increased their equity holdings from $97.5 billion in 1990 to $ 281.7 
billion in 1994 representing aggregate increase in pension funds assets invested in 
foreign equities from 3.1% in 1990 to 5.5% in 1994 and an increase in mutual fund 
assets from 1.7% in 1990 to 3.9% in 1994. Their investment increased from $ 17.7 
billion in 1989 to $ 61.9 billion in 1993 then to $ 85.3 billion in 1994. The percentage of 
their portfolio invested in international equity also increased from 3.8% in 1989 to 7.7% 
in 1993 and to 10.5% in 199430. Such international investment reduces systematic risks 
that cannot be avoided through domestic portfolio investments alone. ADR and GDR 
also contributed to this increase.  
As of December 2001, 12,860 foreigners were registered as investors in the 
Korean stock market, an increase of 9.5% over the previous year. Among them, 38.9% 
were U.S. investors; of these U.S. investors, 62.7% are institutional investors. Most of 
these institutional investors represent investment companies (42.8%) – while a mere 6% 
represent pension funds. Including direct investment, foreign investors hold 36.6% of 
the total market value as of the end of 2001.31 Foreign pension fund represent 10.1% of 
total market value -- larger than paltry Korean pension fund holdings (1.1%). Their 
119.8% turnover rate was much lower than the average market turnover rate, which is 
599%. But the foreigner turnover rate is still much higher than that of the U.S. market. 
This figure indicates the degree of market volatility and insufficiency of long-term 
investors.32 Table 2-5 shows the aggregate volume of international equities held by 25 
of the largest U.S. pension funds; we can note that the majority of their international 
                                            
30 In 1999, the foreign holdings of TIAA-CREF amounted to more than $23billion in 32 different market. CalPERS 
holds $32 billion overseas. Hermes held more than $20 billion aboard. 
31 Excluding direct investment, they hold 34% of market value. 
32 2001 Overview of foreign investors (Finance Supervisory Board,2002 Feb) 
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equity investments have increasingly involved large pension funds in recent years, from 
27.9% of all international investments in 1996, to 65.8% in 1999. 
 
Table 2-5:  International Equities of the largest 25 U.S. Pension Funds 
(Billion U$) 
    1996 1998 1999 
25 pension funds amounts 110.8 181.1 265.6 
  Percentage 27.9% 41.9% 65.8% 
Total U.S. investors amounts 397.7 432 403.7 
 
 
Ⅲ.  CORPOATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES OF  
 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
 
3-1  A Chronicle of Corporate Governance Policy and Guidelines 
 
    The Bank of England and London Stock Exchange initiated the first 
corporate governance code of the modern era in the U.K. in 1992. This spawned so 
many imitators -- more than 60 governance codes in 30 markets as well as 
numerous international codes.33 In the U.S., the National Association of Corporate 
Directors Blue Ribbon Commission on Corporate Governance identified key 
                                            
33 Corporate Governance (Monks and Nell) 
Some leading international codes include: Bosch Report (Australia) 1995, Cardon Report (Belgium) 1998, Dey 
Report (Canada) 1994, Vienot Report (France) 1994,1999, King Report (South Africa) 1994, Peters Committee 
(Netherland) 1997, Corporate Governance Forum of Japan 1998, The Governance of Spain Companies 1998, 
Swedish Academy Report 1994, German Panel on Corporate Governance 2000 
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guidelines for: director selection, evaluation, compensation; further, a complete 
board evaluation was established 1994 and the Business Round Table announced its 
Statement on Corporate Governance in September 1997. 
In response to growing concerns over corporate governance in OECD 
countries, seemingly justified by the Asian financial crisis, OECD Ministers in 
1998 asked the OECD to develop a set of corporate governance principles that 
could be useful to OECD Members and non-Member countries. In June 1998 the 
OECD established an Ad Hoc Task Force on Corporate Governance with 
representatives from all member governments and key international organizations, 
including the World Bank, as well as a number of private sector and labor 
representatives with special expertise in corporate governance. At their annual 
meeting, OECD ministers approved the Principles in May 1999, offering guidelines 
under five categories: shareholders’ rights, the responsibilities of shareholders, the 
rights of stakeholders’, disclosure and transparency, and the role and structure of the 
board. This code is intended as reference for the companies that wish to amend their 
governance practices. In July 1999, the International Corporate Governance 
Network (ICGN), an investors’ group representing more than $6 trillion in assets, 
made a more forceful statement of global principles. The ICGN believes that it is in 
companies’ best interests to adhere to such recommendation even in the absence of 
any domestic legal requirements. In the meantime CalPERS and TIAA-CREF 
settled their own guidelines in 1998. During the Corporate Governance Forum of 
Japan corporate governance guidelines were issued in May 1998; German too 
bowed to international pressure and produced their first-ever corporate governance 
code in January 2000. Korea set up a “Code of Best Practice for Corporate 
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Governance” in September 1999. 
 
3-2 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance  
 
In its preamble on corporate governance, the OECD clearly states that its 
guidelines are not binding and not intended to be a detailed prescription for national 
legislation. Nevertheless, their principles make a useful reference point for policy 
makers.34 
The right of shareholders: regarding the protection of the basic rights of 
shareholders included in the corporate governance framework, OECD principles refer 
to: ownership registration, conveying or transferring shares, obtaining relevant 
information on a timely and regular basis, participating and voting in general 
shareholders meetings, electing members of the board, and sharing the profits of the 
corporation. OECD principles also mention shareholders’ right to be involved in 
decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes; this entails respecting 
shareholders’ proposals at general meetings. Further, OECD principles urge that market 
forces should guide corporate practices, and oppose anti take over devices that shield 
management from accountability. 
     The equitable treatment of shareholders: This includes equal treatment within any 
class, cast voting by custodian or nominees for the beneficial owners of the shares, 
economical and easy access to voting, as well as prohibiting insider trading and abusive 
deals involving conflicts of interest. 
 The role of stakeholders in corporate governance: The rights of stakeholders 
                                            
34 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance:  Ad Hoc Task Force on Corporate Governance 
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ought to be protected by law and respected, and violations need be redressed effectively. 
This encourages active cooperation between corporations and stakeholders in creating 
sustainable wealth and jobs. 
 Disclosure and transparency: Timely and accurate disclosure should be made on 
all material matters; such information ought to be prepared in accordance under prudent 
regulations, and financial results ought to need be conducted by independent auditors. 
    The responsibilities of the board: The framework of any corporate governance 
policy should ensure the strategic guidance (and effective monitoring) of management 
by the board; additionally, board accountability needs to be aligned with the interests of 
the company and shareholders. The OECD principles describe compliance with laws as 
they pertain to the availability of information, the key functions of the board, the 
independence of directors (and sufficient number of non-executive board members), as 
well as the devotion of members. 
      The OECD principles are to be seen as minimum requirements applicable to 
various cultural settings. Each country and institution, of course, needs to amplify or 
modify such principles to meet their market characteristics. 
 
 
3-3   Corporate Governance Policies of Institutional Investors 
 
 There is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach in policies or principles that binds 
either members or corporations. While institutional investors hardly expect that each 
company will adopt or embrace every aspect of their principles or guidelines, it is 
valuable to understand the basic philosophy of influential institutional investors in 
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regard to corporate governance. In this section, we will compare the corporate 
governance principles or guidelines of four organizations, which include: the Business 
Round Table (‘BRT’), CalPERS (largest U.S. public fund), TIAA-CREF (largest private 
U.S. fund), and the Korean Code. As an association of chief executive officers, the BRT 
has made contributions for several years that have molded the evolution of corporate 
governance matters. They developed early concepts of corporate governance in the 
publication entitled “The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large 
Publicly Owned Corporation” in January of 1978, their Statement on Corporate 
Responsibility in October 1981. Later, the Business Roundtable’s released a statement 
on Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness in March of 1990, and 
another statement on corporate governance in September of 1997. In Korea the 
Committee on Corporate Governance was established as a non-governmental body in 
March 1999 to develop a code of best practices. The committee was composed of 
fourteen members from various business field including finance, accounting, law and 
the academia, along with an Advisory Group of thirteen law, securities, and financial 
specialists. The final draft was completed on September 22nd through a general meeting 
of the Committee and Advisory Group. Table 3-1 provides a detailed comparison of the 
four institutions’ guidelines in respect to corporate governance.35 
     Regarding cumulative voting, whereas the BRT and TIAA-CREF are not 
concerned with directors that might represent specific groups of stockholders, the Code 
of Korea recognizes that cumulative voting is possible. This divergence stem from 
concerns of controlling shareholders that is more prevalent in Korea than that of U.S. 
                                            
35 Mainly quoted from ‘A Comparison of Board Guidelines and Best Practice in the US’ by Holly J. Gregory 
(November 1999) 
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These organizations share the same desire to protect shareholders wealth through the 
prevention of anti-takeover measures that tend to insulate the position of management. 
Although these institutions have similar general goals in mind, CalPERS supports the 
idea of electing board members on an annual election basis, while the TIAA-CREF does 
not. Instead, TIAA-CREF prefers to unify the CEO and chair (in contrast to the 
European two tier model), in which case they recommend (either formally or 
informally) the leader of outside directors. But such an outlook is not specified in the 
Korean code. Although neither CalPERS nor the TIAA-CREF put forth guidelines 
regarding the size of boards, one may assume that a smaller board is preferable. 
According to the Korn/Ferry survey, boards on average consist of 11 directors and the 
boards of larger companies, on average, consist of 16 directors. Most survey 
respondents believed that 12 is the most effective board size, with a mix of 3 inside 
directors and 9 outside directors.36 As for the portion of outside directors on any given 
board, institutions support a substantial majority (of about 75%), while the Korea code 
decrees that a 50% outside participation rate is favorable. 
One of the most relevant factors in corporate governance is the independence of 
directors. Maintaining the independence of directors is the key to any successful 
governance system. BRT, CalPERS, and TIAA-CREF all detail definitions of 
independence, while the Korean code does not. It is worth noting that these institutions 
define ‘independence’ as having an outside director who has not been an employee or 
officer of the company within the last 5 years; further, they state, outside directors 
                                            
36 The 1999 Korn/Ferry Survey is based on a study of more than 1,000 directors and chairmen of Fortune 500 listed 
companies. The survey also includes statistics on board composition and compensation taken from the proxy 
statements of 902 publicly held Fortune 500 listed companies. 
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should not be affiliated to even a non-profit entity, and cross directorship is prohibited. 
The BRT and TIAA-CREF are more flexible in their interpretation of independence 
clauses than CalPERS. TIAA-CREF allows arm’s length regular transactions and 
individuals acting as supply service representatives. The Korean code is obscure in its 
definition of independence, since it merely requires companies to submit a ‘letter of 
confirmation’ that affirms their independence. The law should be ratified to provide a 
more specified definition of independence. 
        In the Korean code, the committee did not mention the CEO’s evaluation, 
whereas other institutions separate CEO evaluations from those of directors. Generally, 
it is expected that the compensation of directors should be aligned with the interests of 
shareholders and be balanced in providing both long and short-term performance 
incentives. Each company has to have clear compensation criteria and disclose it. All of 
compared principles discuss the need for outside directors to meet in private, without 
the presence of the CEO or inside directors, so that they may evaluate the success (or 
lack thereof) and compensation of the CEO. Only CalPERS makes any mention of 
succession plans. Common committees associated with boards are the audit, 
compensation, evaluation and nomination committees, which are ideally composed of 
outside directors. 
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Table 3-1 : The Comparison of Corporate Governance principles 
BRT Statement on Corporate  
Governance (Sept.1997) 
CalPERS Corporate Governance Core 
Principles& Guidelines (Apr. 13,1998) 
TIAA-CREF Policy Statement on 
Corporate Governance 
Korea: Code of Best Practice for Corporate 
Governance (Sep.1999) 
A.Shareholders Rights 
1.Each director represents the 
interests of all stockholders, not any 
single group of stockholders. 
Cumulative voting is generally not 
recommended for large publicly 
owned corporations 
 
 
 
 
* Korea Code… (continued) 
8. Controlling shareholders should 
act in the best interest of the 
corporation and its shareholders 
 
9. Acts of defending corporate 
control shall not involve sacrificing 
the profit of corporations and 
shareholders to maintain corporate 
control for only some shareholders or 
management.  
 
10. The corporation shall, as 
determined by law, accept stock 
purchase requests from shareholders 
opposing material structural changes. 
1.A majority of shareowners  
- amend the company’s bylaws by  
shareowner proposal. 
- call special meetings 
  - act by written consent 
 
2.Every company should prohibit  
 greenmail.  
 
3.No board should enact nor amend a 
poison pill except with shareowner 
approval. 
 
4.Every director should be elected 
annually 
 
5.Proxies should be kept confidential 
from the company 
 
6.Broker non-votes should be counted 
for quorum purposes only 
 
7.Any shareowner proposal approved 
by a majority of proxies cast should be 
implemented by the board or explained 
the reason for not implemented. 
 
8.Shareowner should have effective 
access to the director nomination 
process 
1.Oppose the practice of cumulative voting 
in the election of directors. Meeting date is 
management’s prerogative. Support equal 
access to a proxy statement without undue 
cost or other burdens on the corporation 
 
2.Shareholders’ approval to any action that 
alters the fundamental relationship 
between shareholders and the board. 
This includes anti-takeover measures. 
 - changing corporation’s domicile 
 - opt out of coverage under state laws 
mandating anti-takeover protection. 
-oppose preferred stock as an anti-
takeover program without approval 
 
3. Not support mandated election of 
directors on an annual basis, or mandated 
directors’ attendance in board meeting. 
 
4.Can vote for alternative candidates or 
withhold vote from unopposed candidates. 
 
5.Confidential voting, one vote for one 
common share, not combine disparate 
issues not to be presented by a single vote 
 
6. Oppose any action to adopt super 
majority requirement that interfere with a 
shareholder’s right to elect directors and 
ratify corporation action 
1.In appointing directors cumulative voting 
system is recommended. 
  
2.Receive all necessary information prior to 
exercising their rights, through which proper 
procedure. 
   - right in profit sharing 
   - right to attend and vote at general 
shareholders meeting 
 
3.Sshareholders meetings may decide 
   - articles of corporation 
   - M&A and business transfers 
   - Corporate disbanding & dissolution 
   - Capital reduction and others 
 
4.General shareholders meeting be made 
through transparent and fair proceeding: 
time, location, agenda 
 
5.Ensure shareholders proposals 
 
6.Exercising voting right either directly or 
indirectly 
 
7.Equitable treatment of shareholders 
   - one vote per share, somewhat  
restricted by law 
   - sufficient, impartial information 
   - protected from unfair insider 
trading and self dealing 
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BRT Statement on Corporate  
Governance (Sept.1997) 
CalPERS Corporate Governance Core 
Principles& Guidelines (Apr. 13,1998) 
TIAA-CREF Policy Statement on 
Corporate Governance 
Korea: Code of Best Practice for Corporate 
Governance (Sep.1999) 
B. Board of Directors    1. Missions 
1. The paramount duty of the board 
of directors is to the corporation’s 
shareholders; the interests of other 
stakeholders are relevant as a 
derivative of duty to stockholders 
 
2. A carefully planned agenda is 
important for effective board 
meetings, but it must be flexible 
enough to accommodate crises and 
unexpected developments. A CEO 
should be responsive to a director’s 
request to add a specific subject to a 
future agenda. 
 
3. The business of a corporation is 
managed under the direction of the 
board but the board delegates to 
management the authority and 
responsibility for managing the 
everyday affairs. 
  The principle function are 
   - select, regularly evaluate replace 
the CEO; determine management 
compensation; review succession 
planning; review and approve 
major strategies, objectives and 
plans; advise management on 
significant issues; oversee internal 
controls; risk management, financial 
reporting, and compliance; nominate 
directors. 
 
 
1. A director’s greatest virtue is the 
independence that allows him or her to 
challenge management decisions and 
evaluate corporate performance from a 
completely free and objective 
perspective. 
 
2. The lead independent director will 
advise the Chair as to an appropriate 
schedule of the board meetings, 
seeking to ensure that the independent 
director can perform their duties 
responsibly while not interfering with 
the flow of company operations. 
 
3. The lead independent director will 
provide the Chair with input as to the 
preparation of the agendas for the 
board and committee meetings. 
 
1.The primary responsibility of the board 
of directors is to foster the long- term 
success of the corporation consistent with 
its fiduciary responsibility to the 
shareholders. 
 
2. Support the primary authority of the 
board in such area as the selection of the 
CEO, review of the corporation’s long-
term strategy, and selection of nominees 
for election to the board. 
  
3. Building long-term shareholder value is 
consistent with directors giving careful 
consideration to social responsibility issues 
and the common good of the community 
 
1. The board shall make key management 
policy decisions and perform effective 
supervision of the directors and 
management. 
 
- setting business goal and strategies 
- approving business plans and budgets 
- supervising management and  
evaluating management performance 
- replacing the management and reviewing 
remuneration  
- monitoring major capital expenditure and 
corporate takeover 
- meditating the conflicting interest among 
directors, management and shareholders 
- ensuring integrity of the accounting and 
financial reporting system 
- supervising the compliance of statutes and 
ethic-related regulation 
-monitoring the effectiveness of governance 
practices 
- overseeing the process of information 
disclosure. 
 
2. The board mandates its authority to the 
internal committee or the representative 
director 
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BRT Statement on Corporate  
Governance (Sept.1997) 
CalPERS Corporate Governance Core 
Principles& Guidelines (Apr. 13,1998) 
TIAA-CREF Policy Statement on 
Corporate Governance 
Korea: Code of Best Practice for Corporate 
Governance (Sep.1999) 
2. Board membership criteria 
1. Individuals who are highly 
experienced in their respective fields 
of endeavor and whose knowledge, 
background and judgment will be 
useful to the corporation. Director 
must have the ability and willingness 
to learn the corporation’s business. 
 
2.Each person must devote the time 
and attention necessary to fulfill the 
obligations of a director. Service on 
too many boards can interfere with an 
individual’s ability to perform his or 
her responsibilities. But the BRT 
does not endorse a specific limitation 
on the number of directorship an 
individual may hold. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. No director may also serve as a 
consultant or service provider to the 
company 
 
2. The board considers the mix of 
directors characteristics, experiences, 
diverse perspectives and skills most 
appropriate for the company 
 
3 .Each director should fit within the skill 
sets identified by the board 
 -Core competencies: accounting or 
finance, international marketing, business 
or management experience, industry 
knowledge, customer base experience or 
perspective, crisis response, or leadership 
or strategic planning. 
 
4. The board adopts guidelines that 
address the competing time commitments 
that are faced when director candidates 
serve on multiple boards. 
 
5. To be re-nominated, the director must 
perform his duties as based on 
established criteria. Re-nomination on any 
other basis is neither expected nor 
guaranteed. 
 
 
1. The board should be composed 
of qualified individuals who reflect 
diversity of experience, gender, 
race and age. Each director should 
be able and prepared to devote 
sufficient time and effort to his or 
her duties as a director. 
1. Appointing competent professional directors 
and respect the appointed directors’ term of 
office. 
 -a vision for and a strategic perception of the 
corporate management, a level-headed and 
sound managerial judgment, an ability for 
managing and supervising the organization, a 
knowledge of law and finance, and some 
experience suitable for the corporation 
concerned.  
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3. Selecting, Inviting and Orientating New Directors 
1.It’s the board’s responsibility to 
nominate directors. 
 
2.Each nominating/governance 
committee should develop its own 
process for considering stockholders 
suggestions for board nominees. 
 
3. The committee is responsible for 
reviewing possible candidates for board 
membership and to recommend a slate 
of nominees. Even the CEO is involved 
in the selection; responsibility for the 
selection of board remains that of 
board. 
1.Shareowner should have effective 
access to the director nomination process 
 
2.The Lead Independent Director will 
interview, along with the chair of the 
nominating committee, all candidates and 
make recommendations to the committee 
and the board. 
 
 
1.Supports the primary authority of the 
board in such areas as selection of nominees 
for election to the board. 
 
2.Not support shareholder resolutions 
requiring candidates for the board to be 
nominated by shareholders. 
 
3. Each director represents all shareholders; 
TIAA-CREF opposes the nomination of 
specific representational directors. 
 
1.It is advised that a committee be 
established and managed for the fair 
nomination of directors.  
 
2.The director nomination committee 
should consist of at least one-half of 
outsider directors. There needs to be 
a review of the method of 
establishing a shareholders 
committee 
 
3. cumulative voting systems could 
be adopted to reflect the opinion of 
shareholders when appointing 
directors. 
4. Separation of Chairperson and CEO 
1.Each corporation should be free to 
choose its own leadership structure.  
 
2.BRT believes that most corporations 
will continue to choose, and be well 
served by unifying the positions of 
chairperson and CEO for a single leader 
with single vision for the company and 
most members believe it results in a 
more effective organization 
1.When selecting a new CEO, boards 
should reexamine the traditional 
combination of the CEO and chairperson 
position. 
1. Ordinarily we would not support 
shareholder resolutions concerning 
separation of the positions of CEO and 
chairman. 
Not covered 
5.Leader Director 
Where positions are unified, it is 
desirable to have an understanding as to 
how non-executive leadership of the 
board would be provided, whether on 
an ongoing basis or  transitional basis. 
Where positions are unified, the board 
designates-formally (or informally) an 
independent director who acts in a lead 
capacity to coordinate the other 
independent directors. 
With regard to companies that do not 
separate the positions of the Chairperson 
and the CEO, the board should consider the 
selection of one or more independent 
directors as lead directors. 
Not covered 
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6. Board size 
1.Board of directors of most large 
publicly owned corporation range in 
size from 8 to 16 individuals. Optimal 
board size will vary from corporation to 
corporation and industry to industry. 
BRT suggests that smaller board are 
often more cohesive and work more 
effectively than large boards. 
1.The board should periodically review its 
own size that is most effective toward 
future operations 
 
 
Not covered 1.The number of directors shall be such that 
it allows the board to have fruitful 
discussions and to make appropriate, swift 
and prudent decision. For large public 
corporations, it is highly advised that the 
number of directors on the board be 
appropriate for effectively managing 
internal committees. 
7. Mix of Inside and Outside Directors 
1.A Substantial majority of the directors 
of a large publicly owned corporation 
should be outside directors.  
 
2.Inside directors will ordinarily 
include the CEO and may also include 
other officers whose positions or 
potential for succession make it 
appropriate for them to sit on the board 
1.Substantial majority of the board 
consists of directors who are 
independent.. 
1.The board should be composed of a 
substantial majority of independent 
directors.. 
1.The number of outside directors shall be 
such that the board is able to maintain the 
particle independence. Particularly financial 
institution and large scale public 
corporations gradually increase the ratio of 
outside directors to cover half of the total 
number directors (minimum three outside 
directors) 
8.Term and mandatory retirement 
1.BRT does not favor the establishment 
of term limits for directors, as this 
might lead to the loss of capable 
knowledge accumulated by directors. 
 
2. The board should plan for its own 
continuity and succession and 
designation of new board members 
 
.1.Every director should be elected 
annually. 
1.Not support shareholder resolutions 
concerning… shareholder-mandated 
election of directors on an annual 
basis, or that director attend a specific 
percentage of board meetings unless 
the board to support such measures. 
 
2.The board should establish a fixed 
retirement policy for directors 
 
Not covered 
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9. Independence of Directors 
1.The degree of independence of an 
outside director may be affected by 
many factors 
   - personal stature or business 
relationship with the corporation and 
with management. 
   - legal, consulting, accounting other 
service 
   - have an interest in a customer, 
supplier, or business partner of the 
corporation 
- at earlier point in his or her career 
have been an employee or officer of the 
company. 
 
2.BRT believes that where such 
relationships exist, the board should be 
mindful of them and make a judgment 
regarding the director’s independence 
based on individual circumstance rather 
than the mechanical application of rigid 
criteria 
 
3. For certain functions, such as 
membership on an audit or 
compensation committee, more specific 
standards of independence should be 
used. The board should also periodically 
confirm that the composition of the 
committee meets the applicable 
requirements as well as any other criteria 
determined by the board 
 
1.Each corporation should publish in their 
proxy statement the definition of 
independence adopted or relied upon by 
its board. 
  
An independent director is one who 
 - has no been employed by the company 
in an executive capacity within the last 
five years.(1) 
 - is not, and is not affiliated with an 
advisor, consultant to the company or a 
member of the company’s senor 
management. 
 - is not affiliated with a significant 
customer or supplier of the company. 
 - have no personal service contracts with 
the company or a member of senior 
management. 
 - is not affiliated with a not-for-profit 
entity that receive significant contribution 
from the company 
 - within the last five years, has not had 
any business relationship with the 
companies for which the company 
required to make disclosure under 
regulation 
-is not employed by a public company 
at which an executive officer of the 
company serves as a director 
-has not had any of the relationships 
described above with any affiliate of the 
company 
-is not a member of the immediate 
family of any person described above 
1.Independence means no present or 
former employment by the company or 
any significant financial or personal tie to 
the company or its management that could 
interfere with the director’s loyalty to the 
shareholders. 
 
2. An independent board is one that 
excludes people who regularly perform 
services for the company, if a 
disinterested observer would consider the 
relationship material. It does not matter if 
the service is performed on an individual 
basis or as a representative of an 
organization that is a professional advisor, 
consultant, or legal counsel to the 
company. 
 
3. However we might consider a director 
independent if the person was involved in 
commercial transaction that were carried 
out at arm’s length in the ordinary course 
of business, as long as the relationship 
didn’t interfere with the individual’s 
ability to exercise independent judgment. 
 
 
1.Outside directors shall hold no 
interest that may hinder their 
independence from the corporation, 
management or controlling 
shareholders. The outsider director 
shall submit a letter of confirmation, 
which the corporation shall disclose, 
stating that he hold no interests 
affiliated with the corporation, 
management or controlling 
shareholder at the time of his consent 
to the appointment.   
 
(1) 2 years (Security and transaction 
act 191.12.3) 
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10. Evaluating board performance 
1.The board is responsible for its own 
evaluation from time to time. Such 
evaluations will provide the basis for the 
board’s recommendation of the slate of 
directors to the stockholders. The Board 
also implicitly evaluates individual 
directors by endorsing re-nominations. 
While no particular approach to 
individual director evaluation is best for 
all companies at all times, each board 
should have a process, formal or informal, 
for discharging its responsibility to 
nominate good directors. 
 
2. The board should from time to time 
review its own structure, governance 
principle, composition, agenda, processes 
and schedule to consider whether it is 
functioning well in view of its 
responsibility and the evolving situation 
of the corporation. 
1.The board establishes performance criteria 
for itself and periodically reviews board 
performance against those criteria. 
 
2. Each board should establish performance 
criteria , not only for itself (acting as a 
collective body) but also individual 
behavioral expectations for its directors. 
Minimally these criteria address the level of 
directors: attendance, preparedness, 
participation, and candor. 
 
3.To be re-nominated, directors must 
perform their duties according to some 
established criteria. Re-nomination on any 
other basis should neither be expected nor 
guaranteed. 
1.The board should have a 
mechanism to evaluate its 
performance and that of 
individual directors. At a 
minimum, there should be an 
annual review of performance by 
the board that measures results 
against appropriate criteria 
defined by the board. 
 
 
1.To promote active performance of duties 
by the management, outside directors and 
the board, their activities shall undergo fair 
evaluation; based on such results, the 
matters of remuneration and reappointment 
shall be decided (9.0).   
 
2.The activities of an outside director should 
be evaluated fairly, with remuneration being 
commensurate to the evaluation results. 
Activities and evaluation results of outside 
directors shall be disclosed.(9.2) 
 
3.Activities of the board shall be evaluated 
fairly, the results of which shall be 
disclosed.(9.3) 
10-1 Evaluation of CEO 
1.The performance of the CEO should be 
reviewed at least annually without the 
presence of the CEO and other inside 
directors. The board should have an 
understanding with the CEO with respect 
to the criteria on which he or she will be 
evaluated, and there should be a process 
for communicating the board’s evaluation 
to the CEO. 
1.The independent directors establish 
performance criteria and compensation 
incentives for the CEO, and regularly 
review the CEO’s performance against those 
criteria, which minimally ensure that CEO’s 
interests are aligned with the long term 
interest of shareowners, that the CEO is 
evaluated against comparable peer groups, 
that a significant portion of CEO’s total 
compensation is at risk. 
1.The evaluation of a 
corporation’s chief executive 
officer is a critical board 
responsibility. A clear 
understanding between the board 
and the CEO regarding the 
corporation’s expected 
performance and how that 
performance will be measured is 
very important. 
Not covered 
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11. Compensating board members and  management 
1.Board compensation should be 
competitive in view of industry 
practices and the extent of burdens 
placed on board members 
 
2.Boards should consider aligning the 
interests of directors with those of the 
stockholders by including some form 
of equity, such as stocks grants or 
options as a portion of each director’s 
compensation. 
 
3.Some corporation may wish to 
establish a specific goal for equity 
ownership by directors, but it is not 
always desirable. 
 
4. BRT believe that the focus should 
be on the appropriate level of total 
compensation, rather than the timing 
of payment 
 
5.Compensation plans are appropriate 
and competitive and properly reflect 
the objectives and performance of 
management. Incentive plan should 
be designed to provide the proper 
balance between long and short-term 
performance incentives. Stock 
options and other equity oriented 
plans should be considered as a 
means for linking management 
interests to those of shareholders. 
1.Director compensation is a 
combination of cash and stock in the 
company. The stock component is a 
significant portion of the total 
compensation. 
1.All monetary arrangements with 
directors (for services outside normal 
board activities) should be approved by a 
board committee; the board committee 
should be composed of independent 
directors and should be reported in the 
proxy statement. 
 
2.Board and its compensation committee 
should set executive compensation levels 
adequate to attract and retain qualified 
executives. These executives should be 
rewarded to the contribution they make in 
maximizing shareholder wealth. The ‘pay 
for performance’ system should reflect 
equitable treatment between the 
shareholders and corporate management. 
 
 Key issues are 
  -Determining what constitute 
‘excessive’ executive compensation 
  -Evaluating the soundness and 
reasonableness of the policies, standards, 
and processes for setting compensation 
levels. 
  - Deciding what constitutes adequate 
disclosure of executive compensation to 
shareholder and public. 
 
 
 
 
1.Business activities of the management 
shall be evaluated fairly, and the evaluation 
results shall be reflected appropriately in the 
remuneration. The board, within the limit 
approved by the general shareholders 
meeting, shall decide remuneration for the 
management. If a committee centered on 
outside directors is established within the 
board, then that committee may make the 
decision (9.1) 
 
2. Calculation criteria for stock options shall 
always be disclosed in detail prior to any 
decision regarding it : such criteria be 
justified to accurately reflect results 
achieved through the management’s efforts. 
 
3. Also it would be best to place a ceiling on 
the criteria. 
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12. Outside directors meeting 
1.There should be an opportunity for 
he board to meet periodically, at least 
annually, outside the presence of the 
CEO and other inside directors. This 
may be a portion of a normally 
scheduled board meeting, and the 
CEO’s annual performance 
evaluation is a good opportunity for 
such a meeting. 
 
1.Independent directors meet 
periodically (at least once a year) 
alone, without meeting the CEO or 
other non-independent directors. 
 
2. The lead independent director will 
develop an agenda and moderate the 
executive sessions of the board’s 
independent directors, and act as the 
principal liaison between independent 
directors and the chair on sensitive 
issues. 
 
1.The board should hold periodic 
executive sessions. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.To raise the outside director’s management 
supervision and supporting functions, a regular 
meeting participated by outside directors is only 
recommended, and management shall make 
every effort to make opportunities for regular 
discussions on managerial issues (4.5)  
13. Succession planning 
Not covered 1.Board should have in place an 
effective CEO succession plan, and 
receive periodic reports from 
management on the development of 
other members of senior management. 
Not covered 
 
Not covered 
14. Board access to senor management and materials 
1.Board members should have full 
access to senior management and to 
information about the corporation’s 
operations. 
 
2. Board members should receive 
information prior to board meeting so 
they will have an opportunity to 
reflect properly on the items. Board 
should ensure that adequate time is 
provided for full discussion. 
 
1.All directors should have access to 
senior management. However the 
CEO, Chair or independent lead 
director may be designated as liaison 
between management and directors. 
 
2.Although company management is 
responsible for the preparation of 
materials for the board, the Lead 
independent director may specifically 
request the inclusion of certain 
materials. 
 
 
Not covered 1.The corporation shall provide, at the 
appropriate time, outside directors with 
information necessary to perform duties to allow 
accurate assessment of the corporation’s 
managerial situation. Particularly when a board 
meeting is to be convened, information shall be 
provided beforehand so that the director may 
sufficiently review the agenda. Also the outside 
director may request information necessary for 
performing duties. (4.2) 
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C. Board Committee 
 1. Number, Structure of Committee 
1.It is recommended that each 
corporation have an audit committee, 
which is required under NYSE rules, 
a compensation/personnel committee, 
nominating/governance committee 
and that membership in this 
committee be limited to outside 
directors. 
 
2. The board may wish to establish 
other committees such as an 
executive committee, a finance 
committee, social responsibility or 
public policy committee, or ad hoc 
committee. 
1.Certain board committees consist 
entirely of independent directors. 
These include the committees who 
perform the following functions 
  - Audit 
  - Director nomination 
  - Board Evaluation & Governance 
  - CEO Evaluation and Management 
  - Compensation 
  - Compliance and Ethics 
 
1.The board committee structure 
should include audit, compensation 
and nominating committees consisting 
entirely of independent directors. 
 
2. Do not support shareholder 
resolutions concerning the formation 
of shareholder advisory committee. 
 
3. Focus on good practice (e.g., board 
compensation committee composed 
entirely of independence directors; and 
a clear and convincing statement by 
compensation committee in proxy 
statement of the principles) 
1.The board may, if necessary, establish internal 
committees that perform specific functions and 
roles, such as the Audit, Operation and 
Remuneration committees. 
 
2.The committee’s resolution on matters 
mandated by the board shall hold the same effect 
as board resolutions, and the committee shall 
report such resolutions to the board. 
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D. Disclosure  
1.It is important that each board 
consider its policies and practices on 
corporate governance matters. 
Whether or not a board will formalize 
its board practices in written form 
will vary depending on the particular 
circumstances. 
1.The board ought to adopt a written 
statement of its own governance 
principles and regularly re-evaluate 
them. 
Not covered  
 
 
 
1.In its annual report, a public 
corporation shall explain the difference 
between its corporate governance and 
this code, and the reasons for such; any 
plan to make future changes shall also 
be explained. 
 
2.Annual report shall include the 
following information (5.2.2) 
 
3. Major items concerning governance 
for disclosure are; the adoption of a 
cumulative voting system; information 
on the composition of the board, along 
with outside directors and their 
independence; the composition, rights, 
and activities of the board’s internal 
committee; and the activities of 
directors and the board.(5.2.3) 
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3-4  Corporate Governance Practices in Korea 
 
As discussed earlier, there is no such thing as a ‘one size fits all’ policy. Most 
institutional investors recognize situational differences in corporate governance systems. 
A balanced analysis of corporate governance practices of Korean companies requires an 
understanding of Korea’s legal system, commercial act, security and transaction act, as 
well as its code of best practices described in the previous section. In Korea, corporate 
governance did not begin in earnest until 1996, and was largely prompted by the 
financial crisis of 1997~1998. As a result, major reform is now in progress. To enhance 
transparency, the government has introduced significant changes in financial accounting 
standards (December 1998) to bring them into conformity with internationally accepted 
accounting principles. Additionally, The Fair Trade Commission mandated that the 30 
largest chaebols produce combined financial statements from the fiscal year beginning 
on or after January 1999. Given that the financial crisis highlighted the deficiencies in 
the disclosure system of the securities market, the government improved disclosure 
systems by legislating the need for quarterly reports, electronic filing systems, allowing 
more class action lawsuits, and meeting out more severe penalties in the case of 
violations.37 In regard to a direct corporate governance system, the government obliged 
publicly traded companies to elect outside directors in 1998. In 1999 the Code of Best 
Practices was announced (which was framed by a corporate governance committee 
composed of various field professionals). Then in December (1999) the government 
introduced an audit committee and other committees in the board. The Korean Stock 
Exchanges gives out annual awards to corporations that achieve corporate governance 
milestones in order to induce voluntary improvement. Many large publicly owned 
                                            
37 Corporate Governance in Asia: A Comparative Perspective(2001) : Corporate governance in Korea by Il Chong 
Nam, Joon-Kyung Kim, Yeongjae Kang, Sung Wook Joh, Jun-Il Kim 
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companied started to improve their governance systems after they were mandated to do 
so by the government. The Korea Stock Exchange announced its own survey regarding 
the improvement of corporate governance of listed companies.38 This survey may be 
compared with the 1999 Korn/Ferry survey to see how wide a gap exists between Korea 
and other national standards. Table 3-2 lists the details.  
    Through a close look at Table 3-2, one may note that there is still a gap between 
the practices of the U.S. versus those of Korea. The average portion of outside directors 
on boards in large Korean companies is 58%, compared 82% in U.S. U.S companies 
believe that supervisory functions over management are the most important duty of   
board members, while Korean companies emphasize the professional knowledge of the 
members. According to the law, Korean companies keep term limits on board 
membership, but in the U.S., age limits are common. Most U.S. companies compensate 
its members though stock options; only a limited number of Korean companies have yet 
adopted such incentive packages. With the exception of audit committees, other 
committees (compensation, evaluation & nomination) are neither legally mandated, nor 
are they the social norm. Nevertheless, there are rising sentiments in society, 
symbolized by the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) organization, 
for more active involvement in corporate governance issues. CEOs are also considered 
influential in both Korea and the U.S. Evaluation and succession systems for board 
members are not popular in U.S., yet are seen as important objectives that need to be 
introduced in near future. Perhaps the biggest gap in corporate governance between 
Korea and the U.S. is the absence of meetings held only by outsider directors.
                                            
38 Korea Stock Exchange press release on December 7th, 2001  
The Korea Stock Exchange carried out a survey between March to August (2001) on matters related to corporate 
governance issues, through a questionnaire to every listed company. Some data is based on 2001 March data 
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Table 3-2 : The Comparison of Korea Stock Exchange and 1999 Korn/Ferry Survey  
Items Legal system KSC survey 1999Korn/Ferry Survey 
1.Number of Outside 
directors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- No less than 25% of total directors 
(Minimum 1 person) 
 
 
 
- No less than 50% of total directors 
  (minimum 3 persons) 
in case total asset is 
 over 2 trillion won  
 
 
 
- 2.37 outside director 
(1,222persons/515companies) 
- 35% 
(1,222people/3458directors) 
 
- 6.01 outside directors 
(405 people/67 companies) 
- 58%  
(405 people/ 698 people) 
 
 
 
Boards consist of, on average, of 2 inside directors 
(including CEO, who frequently serves as 
chairperson) and 9 outside directors 
: 82 % (substantial majority) 
 
 The largest boards average 3 inside directors and 13 
outside directors. 
: 81% (substantial majority) 
 
 Most respondents believe that 12 is the most 
effective board size, with a mix of 3 inside directors 
and 9 outside directors. 
 b. Quality/ Occupation of 
outside directors 
 
 
 
 
- Not allowed present professors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criteria for good outside directors 
Special knowledge 69.2% 
Management ability 10.1% 
 
Background of outside directors surveyed 
Management: (30%), Finance (16%), 
Professor & Research (20%), Lawyer 
(9%), Accountant (8%)  
Criteria for a good outside directors 
 -willing to challenge to management(95%) 
 -special expertise regarding the company(67%) 
 -available outside meeting (57%) 
 -expertise on global business issues(41%) 
 -understanding firm’s key tech and process 
  (33%) 
c. Tenure of directors 
 
 
- may not exceed 3 years (Commercial 
Act Article 383) 
 
 
1 year : 8.99% 
2 year : 13.27% 
3 Year : 77.74% 
8% have term limits 
77% have age limits 
54% have asked directors to resign or not stand for re 
–election (up from 53%) 
D .Multiple Directorship  
 
 
- Less than 3 companies 
 (Code for Security and Transaction 
37.6.3)  
 
Two companies : 5.79% 
 
22% limit the number of other boards on which the 
CEO may serve : 3% limits the number of other 
boards on which directors may serve. 
e. Ages of directors 
 
- 
 
40’s : 17.63%     50’s : 40.46% 
60’s : 33.01% 
Not covered 
 
f. Compensation of out 
side directors 
 
- Generally satisfied with $ 16,000 yearly 
payment 
Average total director compensation, exclusive of 
stock, is $ 41,949. 
84% compensate with some stock 
98% provide additional compensation for service on 
a committee. 
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Items Legal system KSC survey 1999Korn/Ferry Survey 
g. Committee 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- The board of directors may establish 
committee within the board. 
- The board of directors may delegate to 
the committee its power other than the 
matters set for the… 
- The committee shall be composed of no 
less than two directors, in case Audit 
committee not less than three directors. 
(Commercial Act Article 393-2) 
- listed companies with not less than 2 
trillion won assets must establish an audit 
committee (Code of S&T 84.24) 
 
73% of audit committee members are 
outside directors. 71% that chair audit 
committees are outside directors. 
- Only 20.7% of the surveyed companies 
established committee in the board. 
- 12.1% of the companies established an 
audit committee, as obliged by the law. 
Only 10 non-obligated companies have an 
audit committee. 
 
 
- 100% have audit committee 
- 99% have compensation committees 
- 74% have nominating committees 
- 56% have corporate governance committee, which 
usually absorb the function of nominating 
committees 
- 40% have finance committees 
 
Generally, audit, compensation and nominating 
committees are comprised exclusively of outside 
directors. 
 
 
 h. Board meeting 
 
 
 
 
-  
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Average 18 meetings per year 
  (1.5 per month) 
- Boards average 8 meetings per tear (same as last 5 
years) 
. Chairperson averages 160 hours of work 
. Outside directors 157 hours per year 
 
- 69% report that their outside directors meet in 
executive sessions other than for compensation 
matters, without the CEO present 
  Such meetings take place on average 3 times per 
year. 
i. Effectiveness 
 
 
-  
 
 
- Responded that outside directors 
enhance management transparency 
(59.7%) and professionalism (22.0%) 
-Rep of the interest of shareholders (92%) 
-Advising major decision (89%)  
-Evaluating performance of top management(78%) 
- Identifying possible critical threat 
-Monitoring and evaluating strategy implementation 
(67%) 
-Shaping long-term strategy (66%) 
-Planning for top management succession (61%) 
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Items Legal system KSC survey 1999Korn/Ferry Survey 
j .Multiple Directorship  
 
 
-  - 76% of controlling shareholders exercise 
their influence in outside director 
elections 
 
According to director, the CEO/Chairperson retains 
the most influence in determining who is named to 
the board, whereas according to CEO/Chairperson 
the nominating committee has the most influence in 
naming directors to the board. 
. 
74% have a nominating committee, which consists of 
3 outside directors and no inside directors. 
k. Separation of 
chairperson and CEO 
 
 
- 
 
 
- not covered 9% have a non-executive chairperson who is not a 
current or former employee 
88% are not considering a non executive chairperson 
l. Lead director 
 
 
- - not covered - 30% have a lead director 
- 66.5% have no plan to name a lead director 
m. principles  - - 77.1% stipulated the board operational 
regulation  
-65% report having written board guidelines 
 
n. Evaluation  - - not covered -20% formally evaluate individual directors, 73% 
believe that they should do so. 
 
- 375 evaluate the board’s performance on a regular 
basis, another 105 of boards are considering 
instituting board evaluations. 
 
- 75% report that they evaluate the CEO, and that this 
practice has proven effective or very effective. 
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Items Legal system KSC survey 1999Korn/Ferry Survey 
o. Information  
 
 
 
 
 
- Outside directors may be advised by 
outside professionals at the company’s 
expense on the board’s decision.(Security 
and transaction Act Article 191.16.5) 
-52% report that they have a contact point 
with an outside director; only 9% reported 
that they supply regular management 
information to outside directors. 
 
-10% reported that outside directors can 
get advice from outside professionals at 
the company’s expense 
 
-75% receive company performance benchmark 
information on a regular basis 
p. CEO - No covered  
 
 
 
 
-79% report that they do not have a management 
succession committee and many respondents are 
critical of their companies management succession 
process 
 
q. Executive compensation - Not covered 50% of respondents believe executive compensation 
is ‘just right’ 
23% believe it is ‘generally in line with economic 
conditions’ and 26% of inside directors and 30% of 
outside directors believe it is too high. 
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Ⅳ. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE PERFORMANCE OF 
 KOREAN  COMPANIES 
 
4-1 Two Institutions’ Evaluations of Corporate Governance 
 
   It is quite difficult to evaluate the corporate governance of corporations in absolute 
terms, as most institutions take a more flexible position in applying its ‘principles’ by 
allowing cultural, economic, political differences. Nevertheless many financial 
organizations such as S & P and CLSA announce their research regarding corporate 
governance findings on worldwide companies. S & P is currently conducting a major 
survey of 1,600 companies around the globe to complement its other corporate products 
and services. Based on the extent to which a company adopts and conform to the codes 
and guidelines of good corporate governance practices, they are awarded a Corporate 
Governance Score (‘CGS’); CGS-10 being the highest possible score, CGS-1 the lowest. 
Their first report consisted of 350 of Latin America and Asian’s most liquid and largest 
companies, taken from the Standard & Poor’s IFCI Index. This survey focuses on 
transparency and disclosure, and is broken into three major categories: ownership 
structure and investors’ relations, financial transparency and information disclosure, and 
board and management structures and processes. A total of 98 attributes comprise the 
three categories. Given the comprehensiveness of the study, it represents one of the 
leading indicators of governance standards.39 In their first release the 47 Korean 
companies included did not fare particularly well with CG scores between 1~7; these 
                                            
39 Standard & Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure Survey for International Investors ( http://www.stadardpoor.com) 
   The inclusion of each attribute is scored on a binary basis representing ‘yes’ (included) or ‘no’ (not included) 
answer to ensure objectivity. Each ‘yes’ answer is equal to one point. Companies are ranked in order, according to 
deciles. An overall ranking reflects the total number of the 98 possible attributes included in a company’s annual 
report and accounts. 
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results seem a little disappointing considering Korea’s attempt to reform corporate 
practices over the past years. However the report did not cover overall disclosures nor 
did it cover any IR activities -- just annual reports and accounts.  
    Another major report from the CLSA, humorously entitled “Saints and Sinners 
Who Got Religion”, was released in April 2001. It released its `CG Watch’ providing 
results on corporate governance practices across emerging markets. This report 
confirmed a correlation between high (or improving) corporate governance (CG) and 
stock performance. A key reason behind these findings is that CG is tends to strive to 
improve the quality of management, and investors, not constrained to particular markets, 
can avoid stocks and markets where CG is poor. This results in corporate governance in 
itself becoming an investment criterion.40 With these two evaluation results, it would be 
interesting to find the relation between accounting returns and the extent to which they 
adopted the guidelines or codes concerning corporate governance. Stock market returns 
are a suitable method to measure accounting returns because market value represents 
realized values (profit). This paper, however, uses accounting returns, because as 
Professor Joh argues in Corporate Governance and Firm Profitability: Evidence from 
Korea Before The Economic Crisis,  accounting returns better gauge market 
performance in emerging markets, given that emerging markets are more prone to 
market distortions and inefficiencies. Also, she points out, because accounting returns 
are more direct indicators with regards to the prediction of bankruptcies.41  
                                            
40 In their survey of April 2001, they selected 495 companies from 25 global emerging markets covering Asia, 
Eastern Europe, South Africa and Latin America. They updated previous survey questionnaires & it was composed of 
57 main issues divided into seven key criteria, including: management discipline, transparency, independence, 
accountability, responsibility, fairness and social responsibility. They compared the weighted rating points with ROE, 
PB, ROCE, EVATM/IC to seek correlations. CLSA continues its corporate governance focus its latest report: CLSA 
Emerging Market Press, released on  April 8th 2002. 
41 Corporate Governance and Firm Profitability: Evidence from Korea Before The Economic Crisis (Sung Wook Joh, 
Dec.2001) 
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4-2  Corporate Governance Scores and Performance 
 
    This paper assumes that foreign investors in the Korean stock market are 
institutional investors and advocators of shareholder activism, and that they are likely to 
invest in companies that have a good track record on corporate governance. Moreover, 
this means that foreign investors should prefer companies that received high CGS 
scores, which in turn ought to generate higher market performance and account 
returns.42 This paper monitors a sample of 53 Korean companies used in either the S&P 
CGS survey or CLSA’s survey, which received their own CGS. It was therefore 
necessary to find each company’s foreign investor stockownership rate, and accounting 
returns that matched the period (2001) of the CLSA and S&P surveys. From this 
analysis we can find the extent to which good corporate governance effects   
companies’ accounting performance. But due to an unfortunate lack of data, the results 
of the analysis will be limited. With such limits, this work is intended merely as a 
starting point for further analysis.43 This analysis, nevertheless, mirrored the results of 
the S & P and CLSA surveys; despite the distinct characteristics of each of these two 
surveys, a relationship between CG and performance does seem to exist.44 Figure 4-1 
shows the relation between the S&P and CLSA survey scores. The points range almost 
entirely within the 40% to 60% axis, which means that the general corporate 
governance of Korean companies still lags far behind that of international standards. An 
exceptional case is Korea Telecom (KT), which received the highest score in the S&P 
                                            
42 I modified the CGS of S&P surveys by averaging sub category scores and multiplying them by 10 to compare to 
the CLSA’s scores. 
43 Recent research by Black, Jang and Kim shows that a moderate improvement in corporate governance results in an 
increase of market capitalization (Does Corporate Governance matters? Evidence from the Korean Market, 2002) 
44 CLSA is partly subjective and comprehensive survey performed by equity analysts, while the S & P survey is 
somewhat objective, directly analyzed, but narrow focused on disclosures. 
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survey (70%), but a rather low score with the CLSA (45.5%). The government 
ownership of KT resulted in the under evaluation due to the weak political and 
regulatory environment. Regarding the relation between the two surveys, one research 
paper found that subjective measure reported by the CLSA is consistent with the 
objective measure reported by the S&P analyzing 130 companies covering all over the 
emerging market (not only Korean companies).45 
Figure 4-1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Latin America and South Africa companies received higher scores than those of 
other countries. The report indicated that companies listed on advanced stock markets 
such as the New York and London stock markets required more strict disclosure and 
transparency. It seems that Korean companies received lower scores due to lower macro 
determinants. Markets with low macro CGSs are seen to be susceptible to substantial 
falls in ratings that cause investors to avoid them. The macro factors which the CLSA 
survey listed include (1) clear, transparent and comprehensive rules and regulations (2) 
committed and effective enforcement of rules and regulations (3) political and 
regulatory environment affecting CG and ability of corporations to maximize value 
without arbitrary restrictions (4) adoption of international Generally Accepted 
                                            
45 The author of the paper preferred not to be quoted  
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Accounting Principles (5) in situational mechanisms to promote awareness and a culture 
of good governance. Korea received only 3.8 out of 10 points, putting them 16th among 
25 countries. Among the five factors, Korea fared the worst in regards to enforcement & 
regulation, political regulatory environment and Institutional mechanisms, and CG 
culture. It was reported that Korea recognizes the importance of a legal system and 
regulations, and has improved them a lot in recent years; still, the report pointed out, 
cultural problems such as corruption and political interference remain as major 
stumbling blocks to Korea’s corporate governance. 
From the following figures we can see the somewhat positive relationship 
between both institution’s CGSs and foreign investors share ownership, as well as a 
positive correlations between ROE and CGS. Given the marginal investment of foreign 
investors in KOSDAQ, this paper disregarded KOSDAQ-registered companies in the 
analysis of S&P’s CGS survey, and disregarded foreign direct invested companies. 
Figure 4-2 shows the relation between the portion of foreign investors shareholding in 
the selected Korean companies listed on the stock market and the CGS of S&P ratings 
of those companies. Putting aside the situational differences of each survey, Figure 4-2 
still suggests that foreign investors in the Korean market -- whom are mainly interested 
in mutual funds high turnover rates --consider corporate governance in their investment 
decisions or that foreign investor improved the corporate governance of Korean 
companies.46 
 
 
 
 
                                            
46 Some institutional investors select poor corporate governance company and improve its governance system. But in 
here we simply think that they invest in good governance companies. 
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Figure 4-2 
Foreign investors shareholding and CGS of S&P
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  Again in Figure 4-3 we can find a positive correlation between ROE and the CGS of 
S&P; the KOSDAQ registered companies and some companies such as SKC are 
exceptional due to their specific IT industry’s business slowdown. 
      Figure 4-3 
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The following two figures indicate positive correlations between the CGS of 
CLSA and foreign investors shareholder concentrations; this parallel between foreign 
shareholdings and CLSA’s CGS becomes quite evident in figure 4-4.  
 
 
 
 54 
  Figure 4-4 
Foreign investors shareholding & CLSA's CGS
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A strong correlation between CG and financial performance does seem to exist; 
Korean companies that received low CG score underlie such a correlation in Figure 4-5., 
despite the limited number of companies involved in the analysis. 
 
Figure 4-5 
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4-3 The Weakness of Korean Corporate Governance According to the 
Two Surveys. 
 
     As it has already been pointed out, there clearly exist some correlations among 
corporate governance, the preference of foreign investors, and financial performance. 
No matter which way causality is viewed among these variables, it is worth trying to 
figure out what weaknesses exist with regard to corporate governance in Korea. In the 
S&P report, the average score (out of 10) for ownership structure and investor relations 
was 4.77; regarding financial transparency and information disclosure, the average 
score was 6.39; for board and management structure and processes, 4.23. Korea’s 
disclosure system received a higher score since the system was overhauled quite a while 
ago; lower scores in ownership structure and board and management structure and 
processes were received.  
    It is natural that Korean companies would receive lower scores in regard to 
ownership structure. The S&P stated that a company’s actual ownership structure 
should be transparent, and not obscured by cross-holdings, management controlled 
corporate holdings, nominee holdings, and the like. Although Korean companies are 
legally required to disclose shareholdings of over 5% with the Financial Supervisory 
Service (FSS) and KSE (KIND system), they are reluctant to share such information in 
their annual reports; further, the 5% rule conceals the fact that cross-holdings blur the 
true influence that controlling shareholders enjoy. According to a KSE report, 
controlling shareholders in the 10 largest conglomerates average 31.84% of outstanding 
shares.47 In other words, regardless of the 5% rule, more detailed disclosures in regards 
to major shareholders is still to identify substantial, majority holders -- including 
                                            
47  Korea stock Exchange news release, Jan.29th 2001 
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indirect ownership and in cases that voting control is needed. Secondly, Korea was 
handicapped due to the concentration and influence of share ownership, which is a far 
more serious problem than managerial issues. Its criteria of is that the concentration of 
interests and influence of controlling shareholders of the parent company on the 
independent board action should not occur through block holdings of key operating 
subsidiaries and through the effective control of key customers and supplier. In the 
Korean marketplace, however, some companies have affiliations (shareholdings) 
amongst major suppliers and customers in order to prevent takeovers. This may be 
viewed as a good strategy that facilitates stable management, unless these large block 
holders fail to respect the interests of other stakeholders or marginalize the 
independence of the board.  
Korea’s board structure and process is the area of CG that requires the most 
reform. One of the many problematic issues in this area is the independence of non-
employed directors, as well as the matter of board and executive compensation, 
evaluation and succession policies. A significant portion of the board need be truly 
independent (through the appointment of so-called outside directors) to ensure the long-
term interests of all shareholders and the interests of other stakeholders as well. But the 
Korean board system has made little progress, despite the fact that even the government 
adopted an outside director system several years ago. In the corporate sector outside 
directors do not represent a substantial majority and are not truly independent. With the 
exception of some banks, most of Korean companies have far less than a 75% 
proportion of outside board directors. Only 36% of the companies legally obliged to do 
so maintain more than a 50% proportion of outside board directors.48 An even more 
                                            
48 Only three banks (The First Bank (94%), Shinhan Bank (89%) ,and Kookmin bank (83%)) have an outside board 
directorship exceeding 75%. Among 67 companies legally obliged to have outside directors, 43 companies -- 
including Samsung Electronics – maintain a 50% proportion of outside directors ( Korea Stock Exchange report, 
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pressing matter is not merely the lack of outside directors, but rather their lack of real  
independence from the CEO or controlling shareholders. The passive exercise of 
shareholders’ rights only further exacerbates abuses created from the CEO (and 
controlling shareholders) possessing unyielding powers. As Alan Greenspan remarked, 
an effective way to secure the independence of the board and to restrain a powerful 
CEO is through the activism of institutional investors. Nevertheless it is the Korean 
norm for institutional investors not to actively exercise their shareholder’s right even 
though have legal entitlement to do so. Enlarging the investment level into stock market 
pension funds, therefore, would be a vital first step to build activism among institutional 
investors.49 In tangent with these pursuits corporate governance guidelines need to be 
further developed and advanced. Korean institutional investors are yet to attempt to 
assert any influence. Another serious problem is the lack of any effective evaluation 
system of directors. In contrast to evaluation systems set in place to evaluate operating 
performance, Koreans appear less inclined, perhaps due to cultural factors which focus 
on harmony and respect for elders, to apply such principles towards board members. 
Further, the succession plans of a company like GE seem extravagant (and perhaps 
misguided) in the eyes of many Koreans. 
    The second report was the CLSA’s CG watch titled “Saints & Sinners Who Got 
Religion”. Their results proved to be similar to those of the S&P report. By analyzing 
                                                                                                                               
2001). 
49 According to the KCIF report, large fluctuations of stock price in Korea may be attributed to lower levels of stock 
investments in pension funds. Korea’s pension stock investment ratio is the lowest level amongst other advanced 
countries  
                              US      Australia      Hong Kong     Taiwan      Korea    
- Pension fund assets to GDP       95%        78%          16%          4%        13% 
- Stock investment to assets        64%        45%          51%         32%         9% 
( The Daily Economic Newspaper, 2002.5.14) 
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the binary (“yes” or “no”) results to each question we may decipher some of Korea’s 
weaker points regarding corporate governance as viewed from a western (U.S.) point of 
view. To these ends, this paper first lists the questions in which Korea scored less than 
20%.50 Generally we find that there were problems in the corporate governance system, 
financial targets for next 3-5 years, directors’ independence from management, as well 
as nominating and remuneration committees chaired by independent directors. Also, 
questions (4 of them) related to evaluations scored almost zero. 
 
Ⅴ. CONCLUTION  
 
 
5-1 Korean Institutional Investors’ Role in Corporate Governance Policies 
 
Korean institutional investors are different from those of western countries in 
terms of their historical background. From the 1960’s through the 80’s, the role of such 
investors in capital markets was limited, due to the strong role that the government 
played in capital allocation. Investment trust companies had to buy huge amounts of 
stocks to support the stock market under the auspice of the government, which later 
became a regular market distortion. Banks straddled with a large portfolio of non-
                                            
50 The below questions received scores lower than 20% 
   - Explicit public statement placing a priority on CG (4.2%) 
   - Ensuring debt is manageable, used only for projects with adequate returns(4,2%) 
   - Clear and informative results disclosure (0%) 
   - Accessibility if investors to senior management (12.5%) 
   - Chairperson who is independent from management (8.3%) 
   - Acting effectively against individuals who have transgressed (0%) 
   - Record on taking measures in cases of mismanagement (0%) 
- Measures to protect minority interest (0%),   
- Guiding market expectations on fundamentals (8.3%) 
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performing loan also came to expect the help of the government, which further 
emasculated active involvement in the market. In a similar manner, other institutional 
investors insurance companies and pension funds have faced tight resources until now 
due to investment regulations in the stock market. Efforts to restructure the financial 
environment have aimed at securing sound business practices. It is now also the right 
time to change historical investment habits, as well. In order for this to occur, 
investment policies that include corporate governance principles must   first be revised 
or setup, with the help of the OECD, the Korean Corporate Governance Committee, or 
the like. Through clearer investment policies institutional investors will be better 
enabled to meet long-term investment targets, by investing in companies in which may 
become ‘investors’ in a deeper sense, with a greater sense of commitment, rather than 
simply ‘traders’ or ‘walk the wall street’ type investors. This in turn ought to reduce the 
volatility of the Korean stock market.51 Of course, governmental revisions of the legal 
system are needed, to ease restrictions in institutional stock investments. In particular, 
they ought to raise the stock investment portion of public pension funds that are free 
from business connections with other invested companies, as this has acted as a severe 
restriction to any form of institutional investors’ activism. Major institutional investors 
also need to better utilize their potential influence by adopting stricter corporate 
governance policies and exercising their proxies actively according to those policies; 
this would likely lead to long-term profit by lowering the cost of capital, as business 
strategies become more aligned with investors’ interests. Despite the lack of data in this 
paper, Section 4 revealed that stronger corporate governance fuels stronger performance. 
Joh (2001) and Kim (2002) also suggest that a good corporate governance system 
                                            
51 The shadow voting system is attributed to the passive activism of Korean institutional investors ( Sung Sook Joh, 
2001) 
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contributes to better performing markets and better accounting returns terms as well. 
 
 5-2  Improvement of Corporate Governance Practices in Korea 
 
    As Section 3 of this paper states, Korean companies still lag far behind U.S. 
companies in terms of corporate governance systems, even after improvements carried 
out after the financial crisis. Given the rapid involvement of foreign institutional 
investors in Korea’s market, Korean institutional investors (and companies affiliated 
with them) need to reform their CG practices; this means striving harder to secure their 
investment strategies by getting more involved in the management of their invested 
companies. These concerns should be (and will likely be) on achieving arm’s length 
deals between the management and the company, while avoiding window dressing and 
any management position that is too costly from the shareholders’ point of view.  
Korean companies have to increase the minimum portion of outside directors from 
the legally mandated 50% to a more substantial portion of about 75%. And they ought 
to compose evaluation and compensation committees – consisting of only outside 
directors – to introduce more effective incentive pay packages. Audit committees and 
nominations should be chaired by outside directors. IT technology can be used to adopt 
confidential internet voting systems.  
More importantly, Korean companies have to create a board atmosphere which 
seriously addresses, discusses, and debates critical business decisions; rubber-stamping 
will no longer suffice in today’s competitive age, nor will short and `amicable’ board 
meetings based on merely hierarchy and rank (in which younger members or new 
employees quake in their boots at the prospect of offering any dissenting advice). To 
achieve this supervisory function of the board, various units within the company also 
need to strive better to support board members with useful data; such data could include 
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managerial information, market research, technical trends, and the like. Moreover,  
Korean companies have to remove the disparity between controlling rights and 
ownership rights.52 
   This paper merely offers a general overview of institutional investors in Korea; 
although it may be a poor excuse indeed, may I also add that there is only a small 
portion of long term ‘investors’ regarded as Korean institutional investors, and that 
there always seem to be a lack of systematic financial reporting, making it nearly 
impossible to engage in any meaningful comparison with the U.K. or U.S. Nevertheless, 
I accept all full blame for all the faulty reasoning that surely must exist in certain 
sections of this paper. Let me finally add, however, that I firmly believe that the 
activism of Korean institutional investors is not far away, and I therefore expect more 
scholarly work will be achieved in this area in the not so distant future. 
 
 
                                            
52 SW Joh defined poor CG as a high disparity between controlling rights and ownership rights, and the 
expropriation of the firm’s resources in the business group 
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APPENDIX A : The List of CGS from S&P,CLSA and ROE 
Company Name 
Ownership 
Structure and 
Investor Relations 
(S&P) 
Financial 
Transparency and 
Information 
Disclosure     
Board and 
Management 
Structure and 
Processes     
Total points of 
S&P (98) CLSA's CGS 
Total market 
value 
(Dec.31,2001) 
Foreign 
investors 
shareholding 
(Dec.31,2001) 
ROA    for 
2001 
ROE    for 
2001 (for Sec 
co. Mar,2001) 
ROIC for  
2001 
ANAM SEMICONDUCTOR INC 5 6 5 53.3  4,507 49.15 -14.57 -21.91 -4.38 
CHEIL JEDANG CORP 5 6 3 46.7 41.2 8,030 19.9 1.89 4.39 7.88 
CHO HUNG BANK 2 6 4 40.0  12,902 0.3   22.62 na 
DACOM CORP 6 7 4 56.7 42.4 7,182 7.2 -3.07 -10.24 4.49 
DAISHIN SECURITIES CO 6 7 5 60.0  5,860 35.58   2.88 na 
DONG A PHARMACEUTICAL CO LTD 5 7 5 56.7  1,193 12.9 6.69 15.85 14.28 
DONGWON SECURITIES CO LTD 5 7 5 56.7  3,541 11.4 na 10.26 na 
GOOD MORNING SECURITIES 4 7 3 46.7  7,792 55.7   6.51 na 
H & CB(Kukmin) 6 7 3 53.3 53.7 158,203 71.1   8.31 na 
HYNIX SEMICONDUTOR INC 2 5 2 30.0 38.0 13,535 7.7 -33.93 -88.22 -16.38 
HYUNDAI ENGR & CONSTR CO 6 4 3 43.3  2,182 2.4 -12.18 -100 -5.54 
HYUNDAI MOTOR CO LTD 5 7 6 60.0 41.8 38,437 54.21 6.19 13.94 19.91 
HYUNDAI SECURITIES CO LTD 2 4 1 23.3  6,228 20.92   5.57 na 
KEPCO-KOREA ELEC POWER CORP 5 7 4 53.3  119,058 26.5 3.08 5.49 3.98 
KOREA EXCHANGE BANK 3 6 2 36.7  21,258 34.1   14.41 na 
KOREA TELECOM 7 8 6 70.0 45.5 165,778 37.2 4.71 9.36 15.16 
KTB NETWORK 6 5 5 53.3  2,442 7.4   3.81 na 
LG ELECTRONICS INC 5 7 6 60.0 40.7 20,114 28.1 4.32 12.26 13.63 
LG INVESTMENT & SECURITIES 7 7 5 63.3  8,898 5.3   8.74 na 
MIRAE CORP 4 7 5 53.3  2,037 3.5 -28.59 -36.09 -19.29 
(continue to the next page) 
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Company Name 
Ownership 
Structure and 
Investor Relations 
(S&P) 
Financial 
Transparency and 
Information 
Disclosure    
Board and 
Management 
Structure and 
Processes    
Total points 
of S&P (98)  CLSA's CGS  
Total market 
value 
(Dec.31,2001) 
Foreign 
investors 
shareholding 
(Dec.31,2001) 
ROA    for 
2001 
ROE    for 
2001 (for Sec 
co. Mar,2001) 
ROIC for  
2001 
POSCO 3 7 5 50.0           49.5  87,797 62 4.63 8.35 11.17 
SAMSUNG CORP 1 2 1 13.3   8,553 22.9 0.37 0.99 11.55 
SAMSUNG ELECTRO-MECHANICS CO 5 7 7 63.3   29,450 33.5 3.29 6.62 0.89 
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO LTD 6 7 4 56.7           44.1  449,325 59.9 10.75 16.52 8.17 
SAMSUNG FINE CHEMICAL CO LTD 6 7 4 56.7   2,559 8.5 5.38 8.77 6.96 
SAMSUNG FIRE & MARINE INS 4 5 4 43.3   14,223 54.5 1.26 11.98 na 
SAMSUNG HEAVY INDUSTRIES CO 5 7 6 60.0           42.4  13,291 9.3 1.01 3.26 6.53 
SAMSUNG SDI CO LTD 5 7 5 56.7           44.1  25,296 42.7 13.57 21.28 20.68 
SAMSUNG SECURITIES CO LTD 7 7 6 66.7   22,592 22.5   8.07 na 
SK CORP 1 7 2 33.3   15,110 32.3 0.62 1.56 3.79 
SK TELECOM CO LTD 7 7 5 63.3           49.5  147,101 32.3 11.58 19.57 47.38 
SKC CO LTD 6 8 5 63.3   916 0.7 -8.26 -30.82 8.34 
TRIGEM COMPUTER INC 1 4 1 20.0   1,684 4.3 0.49 1.18 0.65 
CYBERTEK HOLDINGS INC 4 6 3 43.3   749 1.6 -3.05 -4.39 -4.87 
DAUM COMMUNICATION CORP 6 6 5 56.7   2,705 28.5 -22.85 -46.85 1.99 
HANARO TELECOM CO LTD 6 7 5 60.0           40.7 7,788 5.2 -7.04 -15.75 -6.9 
HANDYSOFT CORP 4 7 5 53.3   2,246 2.6 1.19 1.28 0.78 
KT FREETEL CO LTD 5 7 4 53.3           44.0 53,997 14.2 8.82 27.59 18.29 
LOCUS CORP 5 6 5 53.3   1,532 20 -16.64 -21.84 -15.65 
MACROGEN CO LTD 6 6 5 56.7   873 1.1 0.54 -12.21 -32.75 
(continue to the next page) 
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Company Name 
Ownership 
Structure and 
Investor Relations 
(S&P) 
Financial 
Transparency and 
Information 
Disclosure     
Board and 
Management 
Structure and 
Processes     
Total points of 
S&P (98) CLSA's CGS 
Total market 
value 
(Dec.31,2001) 
Foreign 
investors 
shareholding 
(Dec.31,2001) 
ROA    for 
2001 
ROE    for 
2001 (for Sec 
co. Mar,2001) 
ROIC for  
2001 
MPLUS TECH INC 5 6 4 50.0  521 23.8 -29.47 -61.61 -46.36 
SEROME TECHNOLOGY INC 5 7 5 56.7  4,908 2.5 -27.54 -30.69 -52.5 
TELSON ELECTRONICS CO LTD 6 7 5 60.0  1,327 22.6 -9.87 -25.67 -11.34 
HITE      0.0 55.2 5,183 63.5   11.17 14.67 
KORAM       0.0 52.8 12,443 53.2   16.62 na 
HANA BANK 5 7 3 50.0 52.2 7,349 52   17.64 na 
Shinsegae      0.0 48.0 10,142 48   18.51 14.94 
Shinhan bank      0.0 44.1 na 48.6   6.07 na 
LG Telecom      0.0 43.2 9,515 2.9   30.42 16.15 
Cheil Communication       0.0 42.8          
SEMCO      0.0 38.3         
HYUNDAI Heavy Ind        38.0 21,394 6.3   -2.51 11.02 
 Average 4.77 6.39 4.23             
Source : S&P, CLSA, KIS           
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